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Résumé 
Information recueillie sur les marchés des drogues de synthèse est beaucoup 
moins avancée que les études sur d'autres marchés de drogues illicites. La classification 
relativement récente des drogues de synthèse comme substances illicites, couplée avec ses 
caractéristiques distinctes qui empêchent son observation, a entravé le 
développement d’évaluations complètes et fiables des caractéristiques structurelles des 
marchés. Le but de cet article est de fournir un aperçu fiable sur la dynamique 
interne du marché des drogues synthétiques, en particulier sur ses caractéristiques 
structurelles et organisationnelles. En utilisant l'information obtenue à partir de 365 drogues 
de synthèse saisies  par les policiers pendant un an, cette étude sera la fusion de deux 
techniques, soit la composition des drogues illicites et des analyses économiques, afin de 
tirer des évaluations fiables des caractéristiques structurelles du marché du Québec de 
drogues synthétiques. Les résultats concernant l'analyse de la composition des drogues 
indiquent que le marché des drogues synthétiques au Québec est 
probablement composé d'un nombre élevé de petites structures, ce qui indique un marché 
compétitif. L'analyse économique a également fourni des informations complémentaires sur 
le marché des drogues. Selon la région géographique les couts de la production et les 
relations entre trafiquant et consommateur influencent le prix des drogues. Les résultats de 
cette recherche mettent l'accent sur la nécessité de concevoir des politiques qui tient compte 
des différences régionales dans la production de drogue et reflète la nature compétitive de 
ce marché. 
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Abstract 
Research gathered on synthetic drug markets trails behind studies on other illegal 
drug markets. Synthetic drug's relatively recent classification as an illicit substance, 
coupled with its distinct characteristics that insulate it from detection has hindered the 
development of reliable assessments of the markets structural features. The purpose of this 
study is to provide reliable insight into the inner dynamics of Quebec’s synthetic drug 
industry, focusing on its organizational features. Using information derived from 365 
synthetic drugs seized by law enforcement over a one year period, this study will merge 
two techniques, drug composition and economic analyses, under a common framework to 
derive reliable and comprehensive assessments of the structure of Quebec's synthetic drug 
market. Drug composition analysis examines the drug’s chemical and physical profile to 
make inferences about the market structure while the economic analysis examines price 
determinants for the same market, providing further insight into its dynamics and 
distinctive features. Findings from the drug composition analysis indicate that the synthetic 
drug market in Quebec is likely to be composed of a high number of small structures, 
indicating a competitive market. The economic analysis provided complementary 
information, finding that both differential production costs and trafficker-consumer 
relations may influence price variations, depending on the region. This study concludes by 
emphasizing that drug composition analysis should be diligently pursued by both 
researchers and enforcement organizations alike to effectively target and enhance our 
understanding of the intricate processes that underlie the synthetic drug market. 
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Introduction 
The production and export of synthetic drugs in Canada has garnered significant 
attention in recent years. The increased level of interest in this market has been triggered by 
large border seizures and recent reports published by narcotics bodies, putting synthetic 
drugs at the forefront of law enforcement agendas and in the media spotlight.  Despite this 
heightened attention, it has not been accompanied by reliable assessments of the market. 
Very few analyses of basic elements of the synthetic drug market have been conducted, 
particularly in regard to its structural features. Further, of the sparse set of studies that have 
assessed its organizational characteristics significant discrepancies have emerged. Recent 
reports issued by national intelligence bodies have implied that a few stakeholders control 
significant shares of the synthetic drug market (Canadian Security Intelligence Services 
(CSIS), 2010; Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 2010), contrasting with decades 
of literature that states illegal crime groups operate within ephemeral and competitive 
structures (Block & Chambliss, 1981; Reuter, 1983; Haller, 1990; Potter, 1994). However, 
the former allegations are based primarily on claims by media accounts, with news sources 
labeling Canada a "global drug lord" (Glenny, 2009) and drawing parallels between the 
Canadian synthetic drug market and highly organized Colombian drug enterprises 
(Godfrey, 2012). These significant charges in light of the paucity of research highlight the 
necessity of conducting comprehensive and reliable assessments of this illicit market. The 
purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical analysis of the inner dynamics of Quebec’s 
synthetic drug industry, focusing on its structural attributes and organizational features.  
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Accurate knowledge about the structural characteristics of the synthetic drug market 
is critical to effectively evaluate the influence of illicit traffickers, determine the level of 
organization among members involved in this market, and to examine how organizational 
structure influences criminal behaviour. Awareness of these market features not only allow 
us to develop an enhanced understanding of the multi-faceted nature of this market, but also 
the ability to create effective law enforcement interventions. When police lack knowledge 
about the organizational characteristics and structure of drug markets, their interventions 
are often ineffective and may even be counterproductive (Yawnghwe, 1993). With reliable 
assessments of this market, law enforcement agencies and political bodies can implement 
evidence based and effective programmes and policies. 
However, there are many challenges to studying and acquiring an accurate 
understanding of this industry, specifically in regard to accessing market participants. 
Relative to other drug markets, synthetic drug actors are highly insulated, often operating 
within closed social networks and/or in clandestine facilities, hindering their detection. To 
overcome challenges with studying market participants, recent studies have emerged that 
use properties of the market, the drugs themselves as a unit of analysis to reliably examine 
hidden market participants and overall market structure (Dujourdy et al, 2003; Zingg, 2005; 
Esseiva et al, 2007). Although drugs are frequently seized through law enforcement 
procedures, given police and judicial mandates, their use often ends as a justification for 
arrest and court room evidence. However, with the aid of chemical extraction, these seized 
drugs can also provide forensic intelligence to gain reliable insight into the structural 
characteristics and organizational attributes of the drug market. Adopting and building off  
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methods designed by these studies, the current study will assess the synthetic drug market 
using two distinct properties of the market, seized synthetic drug tablets and their retail 
price. The first method will use information derived from the tablets to conduct a drug 
composition analysis, allowing us to analyze the structure of the market based off the 
manufacturer's production methods. The second will use price data, permitting an economic 
analysis of this same market and providing further insight into its dynamics and distinctive 
features. This multi-pronged approach to analyzing the market merges two separate 
analyses, drug composition and economic analysis, under one common framework, 
applying innovative data sources to overcome challenges traditionally encountered when 
studying illicit markets’ structural attributes. 
This dissertation is designed in article format and is divided into the following 
sections. The preliminary chapter will begin by providing the overall context for the study, 
informing us of the market’s history and distinct characteristics. This will be followed by 
an assessment of studies that have examined the market’s structural features and a review 
of methodological tools to overcome barriers to obtaining reliable analyses of this market. 
The second section will outline the data sources and methods that have been adopted in this 
study and how they have been adapted to fit the available data. Applying these techniques, 
the third section will comprise the core of the dissertation, the article, which assesses the 
structural features of the synthetic drug market. The concluding chapter provides an in-
depth discussion of the limitations and policy implications of the study’s findings. 
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Synthetic Drugs: A Definition  
Since their inception into the public sphere synthetic drugs have consisted of a wide 
range of substances, which is reflected in the wealth of names designating these drugs, 
including Adam, E, euphoria, hug drug, M&M, rave, X, the love drug, the party pill, hug, 
beans, and clarity lover's, to name a few (Health Canada, 2009). This plethora of names has 
caused some confusion and synthetic drugs are frequently misnamed as a result (Zingg, 
2005). Generally, synthetic drugs may be defined as illegal substances that have been 
produced primarily from chemical synthesis, with the use of various precursors (Zingg, 
2005). This broad definition comprises a wide array of drugs all constituting a variety of 
different chemical substances, due to a multitude of synthesis methods and inexperienced 
or resourceful manufacturers. Further, numerous manufacturers are continuously adapting 
their production methods to create new synthetic drugs that overcome illegal barriers, 
causing the composition of drugs available on the market to constantly evolve. These new 
drugs are dubbed “legal highs” and are created by modifying the molecular structure of an 
illicit psychoactive substance to create a new compound that mimics its stimulant effect, 
but remains within the confines of the law. Recent examples include “bath salts” which are 
synthetic cathinones with a similar chemical structure to amphetamines and a stimulant 
effect comparable to cocaine and methamphetamine (Loeffler, Hurst, Penn & Yung, 2012). 
As authorities detect the presence of these new compounds and respond by passing new 
bans, producers continue to evolve the structure of their products to circumvent the latest 
law. Consequently the composition of synthetic drugs within the market is constantly 
evolving with new designer drugs continuously being introduced into the market. To reflect 
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this wide diversity of synthetic drugs on the market while remaining within the confines of 
illegal synthetic drugs, this paper will adopt a definition that closely aligns with 
designations used by both law enforcement agencies and international drug organizations, 
such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Consistent with these 
bodies, synthetic drugs will encompass amphetamine type substances (ATS), including 
amphetamine (speed), methamphetamine (crystal meth, ice), and 3, 4-methylene-dioxy-N-
methylamphetamine, (MDMA, ecstasy). 
Towards a Criminal Market 
 Synthetic drugs have not always been classified as illegal substances. Their 
materialization into the licit market and eventual criminal classification highlight the 
distinct characteristics of this market and fluctuations in their use. First synthesized in 1887 
by a German chemist, the wholesale demand and supply of amphetamine did not begin 
until approximately half a decade later (Gahlinger, 2004). In the late 1930’s, as 
pharmaceutical companies and physicians became cognizant of their stimulant and alleged 
beneficial medical properties, they emerged into the legal domain marketed to the general 
public and prescribed for a variety of conditions, including depression, asthma, fatigue and 
obesity (Gahlinger, 2004). Eager to enhance soldier performance this trend also caught on 
with the military who began to supply combatants with synthetic drugs in efforts to 
increase productivity and stamina levels (Rasmussen, 2009). These provisions for troops 
began during the 1936 Spanish war (Iverson, 2008) and were greatly expanded during the 
Second World War, as American, German and Japanese armies, searching for a competitive 
advantage, provided these drugs to their troops (Grinspoon & Hedblom, 1975). The drugs 
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addictive properties, their ability to create pleasurable feelings via increased serotonin and 
dopamine levels in the brain, combined with the intense marketing and prescription of these 
drugs created the conditions for a surge in dependence problems among the population 
(Rasmussen, 2009). In response to the significant growth in the abuse of these drugs and 
the rising awareness of their detrimental side effects, amphetamines discontinued to be 
legally prescribed, were removed from military use, and ultimately criminalized in the 
United States in 1985 after more than half a century of legal use (Hammersley, Khan & 
Ditton, 2002).  
Initially accompanying synthetic drugs’ transition into an illegal substance was a 
recorded decrease in their consumption, attributed to both the severance of a reliable supply 
chain and changes in consumer preferences (Rasmussen, 2009). Recreational consumers no 
longer had the same secure access to these drugs that they had become accustomed too, 
having to turn to illicit and therefore unverifiable sources to obtain the same product 
(Rasmussen, 2009). In addition, during this period cocaine experienced a dramatic surge in 
popularity, with many users turning to it as an alternate stimulant (Rasmussen, 2009). 
However, this decline of synthetic drug use was relatively short lived, as a rave subculture 
developed in the late 1990’s, which promoted and highly popularized the use of synthetic 
drugs (Gross, Barrett, Shestowsky & Pihl, 2002). Raves were large parties characterized by 
all night techno music, flashing lights, dancing, and the use of synthetic drugs. These illegal 
drugs were a core element of these parties, as they enhanced the experience by increasing 
positive emotions and creating a feeling of cohesiveness, generating the perception that one 
can experience the feelings of others (Gross et al, 2002). Furthermore, economically it 
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became a rational choice among users as synthetic drugs are cheaper than cocaine per dose 
and their “high” lasts significantly longer (Rasmussen, 2009). In response to this increased 
market demand and the ease with which these drugs can be manufactured synthetic drug 
use experienced a revival and in turn, clandestine laboratories proliferated (Pietschmann, 
1997).  
While a growth in the demand and supply of illicit synthetic drugs (Pietschmann, 
1997) has generated an interest in this criminal phenomenon, it has not been accompanied 
by an increase in knowledge about this market. However, this history of the market informs 
us on some of the unique and diverse properties of the market that generate from the drug’s 
production methods. Distinct from other markets, the pharmaceutical nature of synthetic 
drugs allows for production facilities to be established near consumer markets, as they can 
be produced through a variety of synthesis method with basic laboratory equipment and 
widely available precursors. The chemicals to manufacture synthetic drugs may be easily 
obtained through legal businesses including batteries, match heads, cold medication, 
acetone, brake cleaner, and propane (Cherney, O’Reilly & Grabosky, 2006). In addition 
synthetic drugs can be made using either precise laboratory tools such as magnetic stirrers, 
or easily assembled equipment from accessible products, including coffee filters, pop 
bottles, and hot plates (Chiu, Leclerc & Townsley, 2011). Further facilitating the ease of 
production, after obtaining the necessary equipment, due to the relatively small spaces 
required to produce small to large batches of synthetic drugs laboratories may be set up in a 
variety of areas, including car trunks and motel rooms (Cherney et al, 2006). In light of the 
potentially limitless production areas, the synthetic drug market is not geographically 
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centralized around a restricted number of source countries, in contrast to heroin and cocaine 
markets, meaning that distribution chains are generally shorter and there is greater fluidity 
between positions (Chiu et al, 2011).  
Further differentiating the synthetic drug market, not only are the chemicals to 
produce these drugs relatively easy to acquire, but, once obtained with some experience, the 
commercial production of synthetic drugs is relatively quick.  Natural plant based drugs 
(i.e. cannabis and heroin) require the agricultural process of planting and cultivation, 
favourable soil and weather conditions in addition to a chemical conversion so that they 
may be sold to users.  Commercial production at this level is capital and labour intensive 
when compared to the production of synthetic drugs. Synthetic drugs are synthesized 
through chemical methods with relatively short time periods. The ease with which synthetic 
drugs may be produced in a variety of environments highlights the potential breadth of 
actors who may be involved in this industry and the ability of actors to set up multiple 
covert facilities, influencing assessments of the market’s overall structure. 
This is reflected in the demographics of synthetic drug markets, which has been 
reported to consist of a higher portion of non-marginalized, middle to high class 
individuals, including young professionals and students, influencing the social dynamics of 
this market (Massari, 2005). Many of the relationships between consumers and distributors 
are social, with distributors often being consumers themselves, selling their product in 
private locations and within networks with close social ties (Massari, 2005). The 
backgrounds and relationships between traffickers influences the operations of these 
markets as illicit actors from the middle class may not only have more incentives, but also 
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the resources to conduct transactions in clandestine facilities. The ability to quickly set up 
production facilities in a variety of environments, coupled with the market’s unique 
demographics, stress the unique features of this market, specifically those that insulate 
actors from detection.  
Structural Assessments of the Synthetic Drug Market 
The defining characteristics of the synthetic drug market emphasizes the importance 
of conducting reliable studies with methods that take into account its defining features, 
particularly those which hide illicit actors from the purview of researchers. To date, few 
reports have provided reliable examinations of the market and even fewer of the Canadian 
market, despite claims that large sophisticated groups operate within the country’s synthetic 
drug trade. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 2010 in their Organized 
Crime Report claim that clandestine ‘super labs’ (although they fail to define the size of 
these “large” laboratories) have flourished in Canada to meet the demands of consumer 
countries, such as Australia and New Zealand (CSIS, 2010). Also supporting these claims 
is the RCMP Criminal Intelligence Division in their 2009 report on the Illicit Drug 
Situation in Canada. This report stated that not only are organized crime groups alleged to 
be in charge of “economic based laboratories” (covert laboratories whose sole goal is to 
make profits by responding to both national and international demand), but comparatively 
speaking, they are present in higher numbers than “addiction-based labs” (smaller 
laboratories that are used to produce synthetic drugs for personal use) (RCMP, 2010). 
These claims suggest that the synthetic drug market consists of highly structured groups 
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that monopolize the illegal market, producing wholesale quantities of synthetic drugs to 
meet the demands of consumer countries.  
However, these statements by national agencies that encourage a rigid perspective 
of criminal collectives should be interpreted with caution, as much of the data and methods 
used to derive their conclusions are undisclosed. By failing to identify their methods, it has 
prevented external, independent researchers from reviewing and evaluating how the results 
were obtained. It has been stated that drug market reports based on classified methods that 
have not been subject to review lack evidence of ongoing methodological improvements 
(Kilmer, Caulkins, Bond & Reuter, 2010). The lack of substantive evidence to support the 
conclusions in the reports allows individuals to question the veracity of their results. 
In contrast to CSIS, the RCMP Criminal Intelligence Report (2010) reveals one of 
their data sources. In the 2010 report, the RCMP stated that their findings relied primarily 
on seizure data. However, in addition to lack of detail on this data source (they only state 
that seizure data was used), seizure data has been criticized for not being a valid indicator 
of drug markets due to its potential to fluctuate in response to factors that are not related or 
reflected in actual changes in the drug market. To begin with, police seizures inform us of 
police strategies and thus the activities of these authorities, rather than actual market 
behaviour.  Seizure data may vary in tandem with shifts in law enforcement priorities, 
indicating enhanced police targeting and funding, rather than increases in production 
(Bouchard et al, 2011). While it is hypothesized that using seizure data taken from a wide 
array of regions will compensate for different law enforcement mandates and thus provide a 
reflective picture of the drug market, the above report did not indicate the sources of this 
  
 
12
data we are therefore unable to assess whether the findings may reflect actual trends in the 
market. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the overall sizes of annual seizures 
may be influenced by a single seizure, reflecting one large consignment rather than any 
significant structural change in the overall industry. To obtain reliable assessments of 
market trends and features multiple sources should be consulted for more impartial and 
accurate observations of illicit activities. As with reliable studies into illicit activities, law 
enforcement authorities should integrate a number of different methods and sources into 
their research, for example using consumer self-reports and wastewater analysis, which 
uses the level of drug residues in wastewater to assess the combined usage of drugs, to 
augment the reliability of findings about market trends. 
Providing a transparent examination of the organizational structure of synthetic drug 
markets was a multi-site European study conducted by the Gruppo Abele (2003) Over a 
three year period, three research teams analyzed urban European synthetic drug markets; 
Barcelona (Montañes, Barruti, Pallarés, & Domínguez, 2003), Amsterdam (Blickman, 
Korf, Siegel, & Zaitch, 2003), and Turin (Massari, Mareso, Monzini, & Veglio, 2003). 
Applying a multifaceted approach that relied primarily on qualitative research tools, 
including interviews with police officers and drug traffickers they established that many 
groups operated in a loosely structured, flexible decentralized market, with few barriers to 
entry or exit. Their research was highly valuable as two of the drug markets they observed 
were at different stages of development; allowing them to make distinctions and learn about 
variations in structure. A young market, Spain, consisted primarily of small amateur labs 
that manufactured a relatively small amount of pills destined for local consumption 
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(Montañes et al, 2003). In contrast the Netherlands had developed into a more 
professionalized market that consisted of small groups and a network structure that relied 
on the outsourcing of specialists, such as chemists and individuals involved in the trade of 
precursors (Blickman et al, 2003). Regardless of degree of professionalization their 
research allowed them to determine that the synthetic drug market was highly adaptable 
and an “extremely fluid and multifaceted phenomena” (Gruppo Abele, 2003, p. 223).  
While this report provides an extensive analysis of the synthetic drug market, the 
primary method to investigate the synthetic drug market by the Gruppo Abele was through 
the use of interviews with active, former, and indirect participants involved in the synthetic 
drug trade. Although this method provides a technique to learn about the structure through 
insider accounts of the drug markets, these sources may only provide partial accounts and 
misrepresent the sphere and characteristics of the drug market as a whole. In addition, these 
methods primarily relied on data obtained at the retail level, not allowing for insight into 
higher level players, and thus more influential actors in the market. To overcome these 
limitations in their data, quantitative data was also obtained, although to a lesser extent, to 
examine the market. Highlighting the challenges with gaining a comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of illicit phenomenon, the report concluded by emphasizing the 
necessity of conducting further analyses of this drug market at both the local and 
international level (Gruppo Abele, 2003). 
Underscoring the necessity of conducting up to date analyses of the synthetic drug 
market is the adaptive nature of these markets in response to shifts in the market and law 
enforcement policies. According to the 2011 World Drug Report, in response to enhanced 
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law enforcement targeting and stricter government controls on precursors, manufacturers 
relocated operations to less prosecuted locations and modified the chemical composition of 
their drugs, substituting alternative, deregulated precursors (UNODC, 2011). This 
flexibility was observed after governments restricted the availability of two commonly used 
precursors, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. In response to these new controls 
manufacturers adapted their production methods, replacing these precursors with one that 
shared a similar chemical structure, norepinephrine (UNODC, 2011). Another innovative 
method that manufacturers have used to overcome these enhanced restrictions has been to 
convert uncontrolled precursors into controlled precursors after shipment, to reduce the risk 
of detection during transport (UNODC, 2011). Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) also highlighted 
the ability of producers to modify their methods in response to police tactics. After a 
crackdown on two major precursor suppliers the researchers noted that although synthetic 
drug purity initially decreased it quickly returned to pre-crackdown levels as manufacturers 
replaced the precursor ephedrine with pseudoephedrine, a synthetic substitute. This ability 
to adapt in light of increased prosecution can be further applied to the positioning of 
players, as demonstrated by a qualitative study conducted by Chiu et al (2011) who 
examined a synthetic drug market in Australia using crime script analysis. Through the 
examination of multiple court documents that recorded the sequence of actions of lab 
manufacturers, researchers concluded that not only were producers’ methods highly 
flexible, but so were the roles of offenders, who could fluidly move among different 
positions filling gaps in illegal actors (Chiu et al, 2011). This degree of flexibility 
highlights the fluidity of the synthetic drug market as well as the potential for structural 
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features to adapt over time as groups respond to market changes, emphasizing the necessity 
of up to date research that reflects current trends. 
Innovative Assessment Methods 
The current lack of validated information about drug markets may be attributed to 
the paucity of innovative methodological tools to assess them (Bouchard, 2007). To 
overcome the distinct barriers with analyzing synthetic drug markets requires that we use 
innovative methods that extend beyond traditional techniques. As mentioned, traditional 
methods such as interviews with illicit participants pose significant challenges to obtaining 
reliable insights. This is also extended to established investigative methods commonly used 
to make inferences about drug markets, including wiretaps, police surveillance, and 
informants, which are rife with problems including fractional accounts and apocryphal 
information that may lead to misrepresentations of the problem (Esseiva et al, 2007). The 
history of this market, its evolution from a pharmaceutical product synthesized in legal 
facilities to an illicit substance produced in unregulated clandestine laboratories, informs us 
of the characteristics that entrench it from our view, only permitting fragmented insight into 
its inner dynamics. These distinct properties of the market render conventional methods to 
assessing this industry inadequate and require that researchers apply innovative techniques. 
Recognizing these challenges, alternative methodologies have recently emerged, including 
drug composition and economic analysis, providing valuable tools to assist in the 
development of reliable and comprehensive analyses of illicit markets.  
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Drug Composition Analysis 
Drug composition analysis uses seized drugs to assess illicit market features. This 
method relies on the central component of the market, the drugs themselves, as the central 
unit of analysis, bypassing limitations inherent in using illicit actors to assess the market. 
Drug composition analysis examines the drug’s chemical makeup and physical properties 
to make inferences about the market structure. Given the diversity of synthetic drugs, the 
variety of production methods, the organic impurities that are formed at different stages of 
the synthesis process, an infinite number of cutting agents, and numerous settings on 
pressing devices each synthetic drug is presumed to carry a unique profile based on its 
physical attributes (e.g. colour and logo) and chemical characteristics (the number of and 
concentration of different substances present in the tablet).  It is assumed that these 
characteristics are unique to each producer and can be used to identify batches of 
synthesized drugs, serving as an identifying personal signature. Thus, drug composition 
analysis is uniquely placed to derive information about the manufacturer. 
After the first step in data composition analysis, the extraction of the drug’s 
chemical profile and the systematic measurements of its physical profile by trained 
chemists, the data can be analyzed to identify drugs that share chemical compositions and 
physical features. Drugs produced by the same manufacturer can be identified by linking 
drugs with similar characteristics (tablets with the same concentration of active substances 
and organic impurities and/or physical features). By grouping drugs with similar profiles it 
allows us to examine the number of producers in a given area, the output of a given 
manufacturer, trends in production methods, and distribution networks, revealing the 
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organizational characteristics and structural attributes of the market. Based on the 
aforementioned premise, that each drug carries the manufacturer’s unique signature, if the 
combined seizure data indicates numerous and different tablets, this may suggest the 
presence of a competitive market where multiple, independent producers or small groups 
are responsible for the synthetic drug market. If the results reveal a high percentage of 
similar tablets, it may indicate a monopolistic and centralized market where only a few 
players or groups are responsible for the majority of drug production. Thus, this method 
allows us to assess the market using an accessible unit of analysis, the drugs themselves, to 
provide a rare glimpse into the structure and social organization of drug manufacturers. 
To accurately conduct a drug composition analysis numerous characteristics of the 
synthetic drug market need to be taken into account when interpreting results. In addition to 
the aforementioned distinguishing traits of the synthetic drug market, it is also essential to 
note the two distinct steps in the synthetic drug manufacturing process: the pre-tabletting 
stage, which involves the chemical synthesis of the active substance, and the post-tabletting 
stage, the compression of the powder into tablet form. The first step, the pre-tabletting 
component of production, comprises the creation of the drug’s chemical composition, 
including the active substance and organic impurities that are formed during synthesis as 
well as any cutting agents that are added to the final product. This stage is influenced by 
numerous factors including the method of synthesis, the chemicals used, and the quality of 
the precursors (Milliet, Weyermann & Esseiva, 2009). Following this step is the post-
tabletting stage, which creates the physical appearance of the tablet and involves the 
compression of the powder into its final shape (Milliet, Weyermann & Esseiva, 2009). This 
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step often involves a tableting machine, which determines the weight, diameter, logo, and 
other physical features of the tablet. Punches and other settings on the device may be 
changed to produce different physical features. After the compression of the tablet, the 
samples remain static with no further changes to its structure until after purchase or seizure 
(Milliet, Weyermann & Esseiva, 2009). It is essential to factor in these two stages when 
conducting a drug composition analysis, as they may be conducted in different locations 
and reflect separate actors.  
Providing a framework on how to reliably use drug composition data to analyze 
illicit drug markets has been extensive research in Europe. In particular a project funded by 
the European Commission, the Collaborative Harmonisation of Methods for Profiling of 
Amphetamine Type Stimulants (CHAMP), has significantly contributed to the development 
of advanced techniques to extract drugs’ chemical and physical profiles and methods to 
apply this information into a drug intelligence context. In attempts to create a harmonized 
profiling methodology and a common drug database, these researchers conducted numerous 
studies to analyze links between seizures (Weyermann et al, 2008). Two particularly 
relevant studies, taking the two separate stages of production into account examined 
individually the ability of organic impurities (Weyermann et al, 2008) and physical features 
(Marquis et al, 2008) to discriminate both between and within seizures.  
The first study examined the organic impurities that are created during synthesis 
from a sample of 26 MDMA seizures obtained from Finland and Germany in addition to 80 
MDMA tablets that were collected from seizures by laboratories in Finland, Netherlands, 
France, and Switzerland (Weyermann et al, 2008). The researchers used the gas 
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chromatography spectrometry method, developed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute 
(NFI), to extract the tablets chemical profile and used a fixed correlation value to determine 
whether drugs’ profiles were linked or not. Using this statistical test, researchers 
demonstrated that organic impurities could be used to establish connections within seizures 
and distinguish between different seizures (Weyermann et al, 2008). These findings 
demonstrated the potential of statistical tools to illustrate links between drugs.  The second 
study, which examined tablets’ physical characteristics, using the squared Euclidean or the 
Manhattan distance, determined that diameter, thickness, weight, and score of the drug 
were all reliable characteristics to distinguish between drugs from different seizures. The 
findings allowed researchers to conclude that the drug’s physical properties brought 
complementary information to the organic impurity analysis (Marquis et al, 2008). 
However, given that two separate tableting machines with the same settings can produce 
similar physical characteristics it was emphasized that physical characteristics should be 
used in tandem with other information for more accurate interpretations (Marquis et al, 
2008). 
A further study which examined the value of both sets of characteristics, chemical 
and physical, also determined that organic impurities provided more reliable evidence for 
linking tablets between seizures (Milliet, Weyermann & Esseiva, 2009). This study 
demonstrated that many tablets with similar chemical compositions may be pressed into 
tablets with different physical appearances. The study concluded by emphasizing that 
despite chemical compositions providing stronger evidence of links between seizures, each 
stage of production provides distinct information about the production process and is thus 
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relevant to the analysis whether each used on individually or combined together (Milliet, 
Weyermann & Esseiva, 2009). 
Further research has provided a model for practical applications of drug 
composition analysis, including studies that have categorized and identified links between 
heroin (Dujourdy et al, 2003; Esseiva et al, 2007) and synthetic drug (Zingg, 2005) 
seizures. These studies detail how to assess the illegal synthetic drug market by analyzing 
links between drugs with shared compositions and physical attributes. Using seizure data 
obtained over six years researchers extracted and analyzed the physical and chemical 
profiles from 67 different heroin seizures, identifying 34 chemical groups. Linking drugs 
according to a fixed correlation value, their findings determined that the heroin market may 
consist of fewer producers relative to the cocaine market (Esseiva et al, 2007).  Applying 
this method to the synthetic drug market Zingg (2005) analyzed 1000 synthetic drugs 
seized from 1997 to 2000. Based off his analysis Zingg (2005) found a high number of 
distinct profiles, implying a high number of  producers in the market. The practical 
application of this method demonstrates its utility in assessing the organization of 
clandestine markets. 
Economic Analysis: Price Determinants 
A further method to analyze the synthetic drug industry is through an economic 
analysis. The core data source of this analysis are prices, which are a basic element of the 
market and can reveal the economic forces and factors at work in illicit enterprises. Drug 
prices are a valued research tool to analyze illegal drug industries, as they are a 
fundamental component of drug markets (Caulkins & Reuter, 1996; Caulkins & Baker, 
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2010). As we know little about the synthetic drug market we also know little about price 
variations therein and the factors that account for such price variations. Price data has been 
used extensively to inform drug policies and provide insights about drug markets, including 
the effectiveness of law enforcement interventions (Caulkins & Reuter, 2010) and to 
monitor changes in the structure of illicit drug markets (Rhodes, Hyatt & Scheiman, 1994). 
These studies rely primarily on price oscillations over time to make inferences about 
changes in the drug market. However, to reliably use price data to analyze illegal drug 
markets, it is essential that the determinants of illicit drug prices are comprehensively 
understood; otherwise we risk making faulty conclusions and attributing price fluctuations 
to unrelated factors. In addition knowledge of the determinants of these price variations can 
provide information about the internal dynamics of the illicit market, revealing production 
costs, behavioural trends, market structure, consumer trends, demand and supply and other 
factors that lead to the final setting of prices. Currently there is a lack of empirical 
knowledge about synthetic drug markets, particularly in regards to their price determinants. 
Current research on drug markets demonstrate that they are influenced by both the same 
economic rules as legal markets as well as unique factors associated with operating in an 
illegal market. To begin with, drug prices are governed by similar market forces as legal 
commodities (Reuter & Haaga, 1989; Pietschmann, 1997; Ritter, 2006), complying with 
basic economic supply and demand principles (Ritter, 2006).  In its most basic form, 
changes in the market are reflected in the supply or demand of a commodity, which 
subsequently impacts its price. Price changes occur to restore market equilibrium, where 
supply equals demand, so as to regulate product shortages or excesses (Moore et al, 2005).  
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Research on the heroin drug market has demonstrated that one of the effects of a shortage 
of heroin supply is an increase in price, although the purity or volume may also be 
influenced to compensate for shortages (Moore et al, 2005). In addition, according to 
economic theory the structure of the market influences the degree to which drugs are 
marked-up from their wholesale cost to their retail price. In markets where the structure 
more closely resembles a monopoly, prices generally have a higher mark-up, as market 
controllers can set prices without fear of being undermined by other competitors. This 
potential to set prices higher in monopolistic industries is particularly applicable to the drug 
market which has a relatively low price elasticity of demand (Costa Storti & De Grauwe, 
2009). In contrast, within a competitive market price mark-ups will generally be lower, 
resulting in lower prices for consumers. Competition between traffickers drives prices 
down as actors attempt to attract business and users have the option to select from a variety 
of suppliers (Costa Storti & De Grauwe, 2009). However, recent research has been 
exploring how the unique characteristics of illicit markets, may make it diverge from 
conventional licit market models (Caulkins & Reuter, 2010). 
Although drugs comply with some of the same principles as legal goods, current 
prices of illicit drugs are significantly higher than were they sold in a legal market (Moore, 
1990; Miron & Zwiebel, 1995). To account for these price disparities, additional distinct 
factors, tied to their illegality, also influence the retail price of drugs (Caulkins & Reuter, 
1998). While operating in an illegal market reduces some costs associated with running an 
enterprise, additional risks incurred by the product’s criminality significantly increases 
expenses. Operating in an illegal market allows fewer expenses due to drugs small volume 
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and the ability of drug participants to transport or store drugs illegally (e.g. in abandoned 
warehouses), which means that shipping and storage costs are often minimal (Caulkins & 
Reuter, 1998). In addition, drug traffickers products are not taxed and marketing costs are 
negligible, as advertising attracts unwanted law enforcement attention. Thus, marketing is 
generally limited, if any, to the physical modification of the drug’s packaging with a brand, 
such as a stamp of a logo (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998). However, these financial benefits are 
overshadowed by the costs associated with the risks of operating in an illegal market, which 
are primarily responsible for drugs’ high prices. These risks include violence, law 
enforcement seizures of their product, incarceration, and associated legal costs (Caulkins & 
Reuter, 1998). In a period with high rates of drug associated violence in the U.S., during the 
late 1980s, Caulkins and Reuter (1998) determined that the risk of being a victim of serious 
violence was responsible for 40% of total costs of supplying cocaine to customers. These 
additional risks significantly hike up transaction costs and subsequently the drugs final 
retail price. 
In addition, drug prices vary widely from transaction to transaction. A major 
determinant of these fluctuations is the quantity of drugs that are sold during each sales 
transaction. As the quantity of drugs purchased per transaction increases there is a 
corresponding decrease in the price per unit sold (Caulkins & Padman, 1993). Although 
quantity discounts are also observed in licit markets, the degree that drugs are marked-up in 
illicit markets is significantly higher (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998).  In the illicit drug market, 
drugs often pass hands multiple times through players to the different market levels, from 
the wholesale supply to the final purchase by individual users (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998). 
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With each subsequent movement of the product down the distribution chain, the quantity of 
the drug sold generally decreases with the price per unit increasing, with bulk purchases 
transpiring at the wholesale level for the lowest prices and individual drug purchases at the 
end user level with the highest cost per unit (Caulkins & Padman, 1993). The greatest 
mark-ups in this process occurs between the price paid by the bulk dealer who purchases 
directly from the supplier and the final transaction between the trafficker and consumer 
(Caulkins & Reuter, 1998).  
The high number of players required to covertly move drugs from producer to final 
user constitutes another main cost of drug trafficking, the labor cost (Caulkins & Reuters, 
1998). This inefficient distribution system that is often necessary for drugs to clandestinely 
pass drugs from top market levels through to lower levels influences the share of profits 
that each player receives, and thus what the drug is sold for. These labor costs may be 
influenced by technological advances that improve business efficiency in licit economies, 
such as improved communication and transport services. With improved and easier 
communication between suppliers, purchases may become more efficient requiring fewer 
intermediaries to process transactions and pass on messages (Costa Storti & De Grauwe 
2009). In addition, recent trends that have increased accessibility to transport and overall 
licit travel has permitted illicit drug manufacturers to more easily blend in and decrease the 
chances of detection (Costa Storti & De Grauwe, 2009).  Illicit markets that operate more 
efficiently, with fewer intermediaries and less risk, have fewer costs to pass on to 
consumers. 
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In addition to a drug traffickers costs, drug purchasers’ expectations and credence of 
the drug’s purity also influences prices. This was demonstrated by the “Expected Purity 
Hypothesis” developed by Caulkins (1994), which states that a key factor that influences 
drug prices are consumers’ perceptions of the drug’s potency. Given that drugs are 
“experience goods” purchasers are often unable to assess their quality until after 
consumption (Reuter & Caulkins, 2004; Caulkins, 2007). Additionally, even after 
consumption it is difficult for the user to estimate the drugs purity, as some cutting agents 
have psychoactive effects distorting their perception of the drugs quality (Reuter & 
Caulkins, 2004). Thus, consumers, unable to  assess the drug’s true quality may rely on 
other factors, such as the drugs image, brand, and drug traffickers reputation to evaluate the 
quality and hence the price they will pay, during the time of purchase.  
This finding has been confirmed in both the cannabis (Lakhdar, 2009) and cocaine 
market (Evrard, Legleye, Cadet-Taïrou, 2010). Lakhdar (2009) found that heavy users of 
cannabis expectation of the cannabis’ potency rather than its true potency influenced the 
price they paid, with the price increasing approximately 1.2% when the customer’s 
perception of the drugs potency increased by 10%. He also demonstrated that consumer’s 
expectations of the products quality were influenced by the drug’s brand, although brands 
were only minimally correlated with the drug’s true quality (Lakhdar, 2009). Evrard et al 
(2010) also found that prices were partially influenced by an user’s perception of quality, 
which primarily depended on the information provided by the trafficker. Thus, this provides 
us with evidence, that prices are marginally influenced, by the consumers’ credence of the 
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drug’s potency and that drug customers may become victims of strategic manipulation by 
traffickers to increase their profits (Reuter & Caulkins, 2012). 
Despite extensive research that has examined various determinants of drug prices, 
only a few have examined how the drugs true or perceived quality, or brand influences 
prices, and none were found to empirically examine how these factors influence the 
determinants of synthetic drug prices. Given the unique characteristics of synthetic drug 
markets, higher costs associated with production, the logos associated with synthetic drug 
tablets, and drug participant (traffickers and users) demographics, it is essential to examine 
separately whether these factors influence synthetic drugs’ retail prices. Extensive research 
has identified numerous interacting factors that influence drug prices, however few studies 
have examined how the quality, brand of the drug, and a purchaser’s perception of the drug 
can impact prices, despite the fact that there is evidence that these factors may play a large 
role in the synthetic drug market. 
To begin with, the production costs associated with manufacturing synthetic drugs 
may be significantly higher than the costs associated with producing organic drugs, such as 
heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. In organic markets, markets in which drugs are produced 
using agriculture methods, production costs are relatively cheap. For example, the raw 
materials to produce heroin are very low, forming a marginal portion of its final price, with 
prices being marked up 99% from wholesale in its country of origin to the retail price it is 
sold for in the United States (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998). Consequently, production costs are 
so insignificant that they have not been shown to influence prices (Reuter & Caulkins, 
2012). However, in contrast some scholars have suggested that the quality of synthetic 
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drugs drives price fluctuations in some markets (Antonopolous, Papanicolaou & Simpson, 
2010). The manufacture of synthetic drugs requires acquiring and synthesizing various 
chemicals, and these associated production costs may be higher. Although, studies have not 
specifically determined the costs of these chemicals on the black market, one study that has 
examined the costs of operating a synthetic drug laboratory may suggest that raw materials 
consist of a larger share of drug traffickers’ total costs. Using data obtained from the 
internet, Bouchard et al (2011) assessed that it costs approximately $200 to produce one 
ounce of meth in a small lab, excluding the cost of anhydrous ammonia, labor and risks. 
This one ounce, which is cut with fillers to expand its volume by two or three ounces, is 
then sold for approximately $1500 an ounce. Thus, this indicates that if meth is diluted to 
three times its volume, drugs are marked up approximately 22.5%.  Consequently, 
production costs for small labs play a larger role in contributing to total costs, possibly 
meaning that the drugs composition, and therefore quality, has a greater influence on its 
price.  
However, higher production costs may not apply to all synthetic drug 
manufacturers. Studies have demonstrated that some producers may steal the raw materials 
to produce synthetic drugs (Sexton, Carlson, Leukefeld & Booth, 2006) and manufacture 
laboratory equipment out of inexpensive products, such as coffee filters (Chiu et al, 2011), 
significantly reducing production costs. In addition, large laboratories that produce 
synthetic drugs in bulk may obtain their raw materials at a lower price, reducing production 
costs. Thus, for synthetic drug manufacturers for whom ingredients form a significant 
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portion of their total costs, it may be assumed that its quality plays a greater role in the final 
retail price, as these drugs cost more to produce.  
Furthermore, synthetic drug consumers may place a greater emphasis on visual 
characteristics, specifically the drug’s logo. Logos have only relatively recently appeared 
on illegal synthetic drugs as a method to market drugs (Duterte, Jacinto, Sales & Murphy, 
2009). Originally synthetic drugs were consumed as small white tablets, however this 
changed in the late 1990s when producers began to imprint a variety of distinct colours and 
logos on ecstasy tablets (Duterte et al, 2009). It is suggested that synthetic drug distributors 
may choose specific brands for their pills to convey messages to consumers about their 
product (Duterte et al 2009). Thus, drug consumers, who are unable to evaluate the quality 
of the pill during the time of purchase may rely more on the drugs brand to make inferences 
about its composition and quality more so than in other drug markets. Consequently, drug 
brands perceived to represent drugs of higher quality may be sold for higher prices.  
To contribute to our overarching understanding of the synthetic market, it is 
essential to explore these factors to gain insight into the inner workings of the market. To 
date research has allowed us to determine that drug prices in the illicit market are governed 
by many of the same rules as legal economies, and additional factors related to operating in 
an illicit economy, including risks of apprehension, drug purchasers expectations and 
credence of the drug’s purity, as well as threats or use of violence. However studies have 
neglected to examine how or whether these same or additional distinct factors have the 
same effect on synthetic drug markets. Learning about specific factors that set prices in 
synthetic drug markets can allow us to make inferences about the distinct features of this 
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market. From what we know, synthetic drug production is different from other organic 
markets, which may play a role in influencing the final prices. This study will explore price 
determinants for synthetic drugs to identify specific factors which may reveal more about 
the internal characteristics of this market.  
The Current Study  
Providing a systematic and empirical analysis of the synthetic drug market and 
applying methods aimed to overcome the unique challenges of assessing the synthetic drug 
market, this study will examine the social organization of synthetic drug producers using 
two methods: drug composition and economic analysis. The first method will assess the 
structure of this market by examining the drugs produced by manufacturers, while the 
second method will capture its distinct characteristics by examining the  price determinants 
of these drugs. The application of two methods is incorporated to help fill the gap in 
knowledge about this market and assist in overcoming the limitations associated with using 
a single method. This explorative study, using drug properties will provide for a reliable 
and comprehensive assessment of the structural attributes and organizational characteristics 
of the synthetic drug market, allowing us to enhance our knowledge and create policies 
based on empirically validated findings. 
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Methodology 
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The methodological limitations inherent in examining clandestine markets benefit 
from multi-pronged approaches that augment the validity of a study’s results. This study 
will merge two methods that allow for the examination of the synthetic drug industry from 
both the perspective of the manufacturer and the consumer in order to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the market’s features. The first assessment, from the 
manufacturer’s perspective, will be conducted with the aid of data composition analysis. 
This approach examines the social organization of production by analyzing the recipes that 
each manufacturer uses to produce the drug, relying on the premise that each drug carries 
the manufacturer’s signature, based on the drug’s distinct colour, logo, and composition, 
including its active substance(s) and cutting agent(s). The second method, economic 
analysis, will assess this same market from the consumers’ perspective by examining 
factors that influence the prices users pay for synthetic drugs. While the first method will 
identify how the market is structured, the latter will further validate the findings, while 
providing additional insight about distinct features of this market based off price variations. 
These methods were selected as the most suitable to respond to the analytical aim of the 
research, in light of the nature of the data and emerging research that provides a model on 
how to use seized drugs as the unit of analysis. 
Sources of Synthetic Drug Tablets  
Drug composition data for seized drugs is rare in Canada, as there are no common 
databases and the analysis of seized drugs is not incorporated into regular law enforcement 
procedure. Although illicit drugs are frequently seized by authorities, their chemical 
analysis is limited to specific requests made by law enforcement or the Courts. Due to the 
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limited analysis of drugs in it was exceptional that we were able to obtain a large enough 
sample to conduct a drug composition analysis to assess the synthetic drug market within 
Quebec. This study obtained 365 synthetic drugs through a unique project commissioned 
by the federal government in response to a growing concern over the rising consumption of 
synthetic drugs. The project was designed to raise awareness about the contents of synthetic 
drug tablets across the Quebec province and to inform users of the disconnect between a 
drug’s appearance and its chemical composition, aiming to demonstrate that physical 
features are not reliable sources of information about a drug’s contents. Due to the 
objectives of this project, the drugs analyzed in the study were limited to a sample of 365 
drugs seized by municipal and provincial police forces across Quebec between June 2007 
to 2008.  In attempts to obtain drug samples from all areas of Quebec municipal police 
forces, the Service de police de la Ville de Montréal, Service de police de la Ville de 
Longueuil, Service de police de la Ville de Laval, Service de police de la Ville de Québec, 
and the provincial police force, Sûreté du Québec, all contributed samples of their seizures 
from their respective regions for analysis. These drugs were analyzed by chemists at Health 
Canada who extracted and systematically classified the synthetic drugs into categories 
based on their chemical composition (active substance and cutting agents) and physical 
features (score, colour, and logo) providing detailed information for each tablet.  
Among the total 365 tablets that were collected in this sample there were four major 
active substances (MDMA, MDA, methamphetamine and amphetamine), and over forty 
adulterants, cutting agents and/or by products of the chemical reactions present. Forty-four 
substances were identified in all of the seized tablets. The most popular substance was 
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caffeine (61.1%; n=223), followed by methamphetamine (57.3%; n=209) and MDMA 
(28.2%; n=103). These 44 substances, listed in order of prevalence from highest to lowest, 
included caffeine, methamphetamine, MDMA, diphenhydramine, procaine, 
dimethylsulfone, MDA, amphetamine, ketamine, phenylacetic acid, clonazepam, ephedrine 
and/or pseudoephedrine, lidocaine, lorazepam, methylphenidate, citalopram, nitrazepam, 
quetiapine, 5-methoxy-N,N-diisopropyltryptamine, 5-methoxymethylisopropytryptamine, 
acetaminophen, benzylpiperazine, celecoxib, codeine, dextro and/or levo methorphan, 
deomperidone, flurazepam, glucosamine, metotrimeprazine, methylaminorex, N,N-
dimethylamphetamine, nexus, niacinmaide, niacin, oxycodone, penicillin V potassium, 
Phenylpropanolamine, piperonal, psilocybin, sildenafil, tadalafil, 
trifluoromethylphenylpiperazine, vardenafil and zopiclone.  
Of the four active substances in this sample, methamphetamine was the most 
popular present in 57% of all tablets. Following methamphetamine was MDMA, which was 
found in 28% of all the seized drugs. MDA and amphetamine were both present, but in 
significantly lower quantities. Only 6% of all drugs contained MDA and 4% possessed 
amphetamine. Of the forty different cutting agents that were present in this sample the three 
most popular were caffeine (61.1%), procaine (8.5%) and dimethylsulfone (8.5%). Eighty 
different tablets were identified among the 365 seized synthetic drugs, each tablet a 
different combination of the forty-four active substance(s) and/or cutting agent(s). The most 
popular tablet contained methamphetamine and caffeine (27.4%). The broad definition of 
synthetic drugs, endless substances used to dilute these tablets and a variety of different 
production methods accounts for the wide array of drugs with different chemical 
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compositions that fall under this designation. Consistent with this sample, reports on 
synthetic drugs have frequently found that seized tablets consist of a wide range of 
pharmacological constituents (Cole et al, 2002; Parrot, 2003; Kalasinsky, Hugel & Kish, 
2004). Of the substances present in these drugs, MDMA has been increasingly less present 
(European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2011), which is 
consistent with this study where only a fraction of all drugs contain MDMA (n=99; 27%).  
The wide range of tablets with different chemical compositions was also consistent 
with their physical characteristics, which contained both a high number of different logos 
(n= 122) and colours (n=12). Of the different logos in the sample, the most popular were a 
symbol of a “star” and “on star”, which both, individually, accounted for 3.8% (n=14) of all 
drugs. The drugs were one of twelve different colours, the most prevalent being white, 
accounting for 61.4% (n=224). Synthetic drugs in other studies are also characterized by a 
diverse range of physical characteristics, with many tablets carrying a high number of 
different logos (Parrott, 2003; Teng et al, 2006).  
All the synthetic drugs in this sample were classified according to the region that 
they were seized in, providing us with valuable information on potential regional 
differences in synthetic drug trafficking across Quebec. Drugs were seized in nine different 
areas across Quebec, including Abitibi-Temiscamingue, Bas Saint-Laurent, Cote-Nord, 
Estrie, Gaspesie, Mauricie, Montreal, Outaouais, and Quebec. Additional information 
regarding the context and details of the seized drugs was supplied by law enforcement 
investigative files, including the drug’s retail price and whether the trafficker was selling 
his/her product as ecstasy or speed, irrespective of the actual composition. 
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These drugs were seized from a variety of different locations with the majority 
coming from private residences (42%; n=153) followed by street seizures (10%; n=36) and 
seizures obtained from undercover agents (9.3%; n=34). The drug’s in the this sample were 
also obtained from seizures made on the road, related to the Highway Safety Code (n=31), 
during arrests (n=18), from vehicles (n=14), in penitentiaries (n=13), from police searches 
(n=11), in parking lots (n=10), from stash houses (n=9), at afterhours locations (n=8), from 
schools (n=7), from bars (n=3), in hotel rooms (n=3), from hospitals (n=3), from driving 
accidents (n=2), a youth centre (n=1), a blind pig party (n=1), a festival (n=1) and at a rave 
(n=1).  
A range of synthetic drug prices in Quebec was documented in this sample. 
Although the majority of drugs were sold for $10 (n= 133; 53%), prices varied from a 
minimum of $2.50 to a maximum of $20.00. Prices were relatively consistent across 
regions, with average prices being slightly higher in Montreal ($9.82) than the rest of 
Quebec ($8.72). As prices were obtained only for 261 of the drugs, this subsample will 
comprise the economic analysis. The prices obtained in this seizure closely resemble prices 
of ecstasy in Western regions across Europe. The 2006 Annual Report by the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addiction stated that in the majority of countries ecstasy 
retail prices varied between EUR $4-9 (EMCDDA, 2011). Also closely following the prices 
in this analysis were prices found in the UK ecstasy market, which observed that the 
average price of a tablet in 2003 cost £5.30 (Schifano et al, 2006). However a comparison 
of prices from this sample to other regions is limited, as our data does not provide 
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information per gram and therefore can only be compared to studies that have examined the 
price of the drug per tablet and not based on the drug’s purity.  
There is some concern about using prices for drug analysis, specifically when they 
have been obtained through purchases made by undercover police officers. Law 
enforcement agents that are present in a short term capacity may lack the social capital, and 
thus the trust and contacts to obtain drugs at a retail price that reliably reflects the illicit 
market. As noted by Caulkins (2007), retail prices fluctuate and are “embedded in the social 
relationships” between a dealer and consumer (p. 15). This study attempts to overcome this 
concern by using prices that were derived from multiple sources, including information 
obtained through police investigative files, former drug traffickers, in addition to purchases 
made by undercover agents. 
Analytical Scheme 
Using these data sources the analytical scheme of this paper will unfold in three 
steps. First a network analysis using the drug composition data will provide an initial 
description of the market, grouping seized drugs according to their shared characteristics. 
Second, with this same data, a cluster analysis will be conducted to statistically model these 
features and create a structural variable, by determining the optimal number and nature of 
clusters for all the seized drugs. Lastly, the price data will be incorporated to examine how 
the structural variable and the marketing variable, whether it was sold as ecstasy or speed, 
influence price variations across the province. In sum, this multi-faceted approach allows us 
to describe and statistically model the structural features of the drugs compositions, as well 
as examine their influence on price variations across the province. 
  
 
37
Network Analysis: Precursor Structuring 
Providing a model to apply this analytical strategy is extensive research that has 
examined statistical methods to determine cutting points for whether a drug originates from 
the same production batch (Dujourdy et al, 2003; Esseiva et al, 2003; Zingg, 2005; 
Anderson et al, 2007; Esseiva et al, 2007; Marquis et al, 2008; Weyermann et al, 2008; 
Esseiva, Gasté, Alvarez & Anglada, 2011). According to these studies, the pearson 
correlation has consistently been determined to be the most reliable method to see whether 
two or more drugs share enough characteristics to have originated from the same 
manufacturer. In these studies researchers link drugs based on detailed information 
including the quantity and concentration of each substance present in the tablet (Esseiva et 
al, 2003; Zingg, 2005; Anderson et al, 2007). However, the data obtained for the current 
study, contrary to previous research, does not provide the percentage of each ingredient, 
only whether a substance is present or not in the tablet, precluding us from conducting a 
pearson correlation. Given the aims of the above project  this level of chemical analysis was 
not integrated into data that was shared with us, and it was exceptional that we were able to 
receive any information in regard to the composition of the tablets. Accounting for the 
differences in data, we have adapted the analysis procedures accordingly to reflect this, 
substituting pearson correlation with a network analysis. This lack of detail in the data, also 
explains why prices, were included in the study, as they served as a tool to confirm the 
findings from another approach. 
Network analysis proved to be a suitable method to analyze the market with drug 
composition data given the dichotomous nature of the current data. This method is a 
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descriptive technique that examines links between actors to infer additional information 
from these relationships (Wassermann & Faust, 1994). Network analysis has been 
extensively applied in the field of criminology by examining the relational ties between 
actors to provide information about the market structure, including organized crime groups 
(McIllwain, 1999; Morselli, 2009; Bright, Hughes & Chalmers, 2012) and terrorist cells 
(Krebs, 2002). Data sources have been innovative, including judge sentencing comments 
(Bright et al, 2012) and criminal biographies (Morselli, 2005). Although traditionally used 
with individuals, this study will replace social actors with seized drugs as the unit of 
analysis. This substitution is based on the aforementioned premise that a seized drug carries 
the manufacturer’s signature, and is therefore reflective of the producer. Thus, the market 
structure will be assessed by examining the links between seized drugs using network 
analysis.  
The network analysis proceeded in a number of steps, all with the aid of UCInet, a 
software suite which permits the analysis of network data. First, all the data for the physical 
(logo and colour) and chemical characteristics (active substance and cutting agents) for the 
365 drugs were input into a cross table, according to whether it shared one or more of these 
defining features with another tablet in the sample. Thus, if two tablets shared three of the 
same characteristics (e.g. both contained methamphetamine, diphenhydramine and were the 
colour blue) they were linked across the table with the number three. This method not only 
allowed us to group the tablets according to shared features, but also permitted us to 
examine the strength of this relationship between tablets. Thus, if a drug shared five 
characteristics with one tablet and only one with another, the stronger link between the 
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former would be reflected in the final analysis. Following the input of this data, two 
calculations were conducted, the density and clustering coefficient, to examine the overall 
connectivity and clusters present in the data. Density provides an analysis of the degree of 
connectivity of a network between subjects, while the clustering coefficient examines the 
degree of clusters in the network. Both methods are recommended to be applied as group 
size may influence the clustering coefficient, larger samples reducing its size (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). This analysis supplied us with an ability to examine the connectivity and 
degree of clustering in the current sample, which is indicative of its structural features. 
Cluster Analysis 
To statistically model and empirically validate the relationships from the above 
descriptive analysis as well as to provide for the creation of a dependent variable that 
reflects the market’s structural features, a cluster analysis was performed with SPSS 
software. Prior to conducting this analysis, due to the high variation in chemical and 
physical drug profiles, some variables had to be regrouped into larger categories or 
eliminated to affect a reliable analysis. It was determined that the chemical variables’ 
values would be regrouped according to quality, allowing for the preservation of some 
detail of the data, while variables that described the physical characteristics of the synthetic 
drugs with low frequencies had to be eliminated, as they could not be assimilated into 
larger categories.  
For the regrouping of the chemical variables, quality was determined based on its 
level of purity; whether the drug only contained active stimulant ingredient(s) (either 
amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA or MDA), or whether its purity had been 
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contaminated with cutting agent(s). After consulting two toxicology and pharmacology 
reference books (Ebadi, 2008; Barceloux, 2012), these criteria permitted the identification 
of three groups, Grade A, Grade B, and Grade C Drugs; Grade A Drugs were considered 
the highest quality tablets, consisting only of the active ingredient (e.g. MDMA), Grade B 
Drugs, were deemed medium quality tablets, consisting of one active ingredient and one or 
more fillers (e.g. MDMA and caffeine), and Grade C Drugs the lowest quality tablets, 
composed exclusively of one or more cutting agents (e.g. caffeine). Ten drugs were 
excluded from the analysis, as they did not meet the criteria (e.g. a tablet that contained 
psilocybine, the active ingredient found in mushrooms). To ensure the correct classification 
of the seized drugs into their appropriate categories they were also verified by a professor 
of neuro-pharmacology at Université de Montreal. However, given that the data did not 
provide information about the concentration of each substance caution should be exercised 
when interpreting these groups, as it is possible that a tablet designated as a Grade A drug 
has a very low purity with 95% cutting agent and 5% active ingredient. Based on the above 
classification, synthetic drugs in the Quebec market consisted primarily of Grade B Drugs 
(n=227), followed by Grade A Drugs (n=71), and Grade C Drugs (n=57). 
Second, it was necessary to narrow the more than 107 values that characterize the 
physical and visual characteristics of synthetic drugs (each a descriptor of the drug’s 
quality, colour or logo) to include only the variables that had a frequency of three or more. 
All the variables for the drug’s colour were included, while only 20 of the 93 logos were 
selected. The rational for choosing only a fraction of all the logos was empirical, as all 
variables had to have a sufficient number of cases (n=3) to effect a reliable analysis; 
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variables that had low frequencies (e.g. the american airlines logo with a frequency of one) 
were not included. Given the  above considerations, the clustering variables include the 
following: the drug’s quality (Grade A, Grade B, and Grade C Drugs), colour (white, blue, 
yellow, mauve, orange, pink, and green) and logo (bomb, capsule, heart, couche-tard, e, 
lightning bolt, star, kärv, mercedes, MSN, on star, pepsi, pinup, 7up, playboy, puma, shell 
V power, transformers, versace and no logo). Consequently this resulted in a less 
descriptive approach comparative to the network analysis. 
Originally, the cluster analysis had been designed to distinguish between the two 
stages of production, pre-tabletting, the synthesis of the drug, and post-tabletting, the 
pressing of the drug into its final shape. Two separate cluster analysis were preliminary 
conducted, the first exclusively examining the chemical characteristics of the drug and the 
second, solely the physical features of the drug, allowing us to distinguish and make 
comparisons between these two production stages. However, the high number of logos and 
colours with low frequencies precluded us from conducting a reliable cluster analysis for 
the drug’s physical features. Even when the variables with insufficient cases were 
eliminated from the analysis, the high number of dichotomous variables did not permit a 
reliable cluster anlaysis and any further removal of variables hindered the interpretation and 
validity of the results. Given the inability to capture the differences between the two stages 
of production through a cluster analysis, the two characteristics were combined for an 
overall cluster analysis. In addition, a separate descriptive analysis was incorporated into 
the study to account for and examine the similarities and differences between a tablet’s 
chemical composition and physical appearance. 
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Price Analysis 
The clusters that were formed from taking into account both the tablets chemical 
and physical characteristics not only allowed us to identify how many drug categories there 
are in Quebec, but also permitted us to further accomplish the analytical aim of the research 
by creating a dependent structural variable to affect statistical tests that take into account 
how this variable and the marketing variable (whether it was sold as ecstasy or speed) 
influence synthetic drug prices. Given that there were four qualitative independent variables 
(a marketing variable and a cluster variable subdivided into three categories) and one 
quantitative dependent variable a one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was selected as 
the most reliable test to predict prices. The dependent variable for this analysis was the 
drug’s price and the independent variables included both the structural variable and whether 
the trafficker was selling his product as ecstasy or speed, regardless of the composition. 
Although the dependent variable only closely followed a normal curve, this method was 
still selected as the variation was only moderate. 
Given that the data was disaggregated to the regional level, a comparative analysis 
within different areas of the province was also completed to examine if there were 
geographical variations in price determinants. Due to the low number of seizures in some 
areas, a comparative analysis was only conducted between a large urban city, Montreal 
(n=108) in relation to the rest of Quebec outside Montreal (n=143). Thus, these ANOVA 
analyses were designed to help learn about what shapes the illegal prices of synthetic drugs 
for the Quebec province, as well as in different regions across Quebec.  
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The ensemble of these three methods, network, cluster, and economic analysis, 
make for a complete demonstration of the structural organization of the synthetic drug 
market in Quebec. A descriptive section is generated by the network analysis, followed by a 
statistical demonstration that further supports the analytical constructs presented in the 
network analyses and creates the key variable that is carried over to the ANOVA in which 
the aim of the study is met: an explanation of the market. This innovative approach 
demonstrates a method to assess synthetic drug markets, where the primary actors are 
elusive. Using properties of the market, this technique takes these most visible parts of this 
clandestine industry, the seized drugs, to access the most hidden, the drug producers 
themselves. The results of these three analyses will be presented in the following article. 
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Introduction 
Research gathered on the synthetic drug market trails behind studies on other illegal 
drug markets. Synthetic drug's relatively recent classification as an illicit substance, 
coupled with its distinct properties that insulate it from detection, has hindered the 
development of comprehensive and reliable assessments of the markets structural features. 
Of the sparse set of analyses many are fragmented or contingent on multiple assumptions, 
only providing glimpses into the market’s organizational dynamics. Further, of the few 
studies significant discrepancies have emerged, with Canadian national agencies advancing 
the notion that a few stakeholders control significant shares of Canada’s synthetic drug 
market (Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 2010; Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP), 2010), contrasting with recent reports on the synthetic drug market in 
Europe (Gruppo Abele, 2003), and echoing discredited allegations by academics about 
organized crime groups (Cressey, 1969). Despite these bold claims that sophisticated 
groups dominate the country’s synthetic drug trade they lack evidential support and there 
are few alternative reports to turn to. To fill this void, it is necessary to move beyond 
standard analyses and import innovative approaches that allow us to reliably assess these 
clandestine features of the market. Overcoming these barriers, this study will merge two 
approaches, drug composition and economic analysis, under a common framework to 
provide an innovative and systematic model that uses properties of the drug market to 
obtain reliable assessments of its organizational features and structural attributes. 
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Assessments of the Synthetic Drug Market 
The necessity of innovative and reliable approaches to assess the synthetic drug 
market follows from the covert nature of illicit players in these markets and the 
inconsistencies that have emerged from the sparse set of analyses. In regard to the reports 
that have advocated a highly structured image of the Canadian synthetic drug market, the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 2010 in their Organized Crime Report have 
claimed that clandestine ‘super labs’ (although they fail to define the size of these “large” 
laboratories) have proliferated in Canada to meet the demands of consumer countries, 
including Australia and New Zealand (CSIS, 2010). Also supporting these claims is the 
RCMP Criminal Intelligence Division in their 2009 report on the Illicit Drug Situation in 
Canada. This report states that not only are organized crime groups alleged to be in charge 
of “economic based laboratories” (covert laboratories whose goal is to make profits by 
responding to both national and international demand), but comparatively speaking, they 
are present in higher numbers than “addiction-based labs” (smaller laboratories that are 
primarily for a consumer’s personal supply) (RCMP, 2010). These statements suggest that 
large organizations play an integral role in the market, responsible for supplying the bulk of 
consumer demand. Running these large laboratories to meet this wholesale demand requires 
a high degree of organization, encouraging a rigid and structured perspective of these 
criminal collectives.  
However, these claims should be interpreted with caution, as much of the data and 
methods are undisclosed, preventing independent researchers from reviewing and 
evaluating how the results were obtained. It has been stated that drug market reports based 
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on classified methods that have not been subject to review lack evidence of ongoing 
methodological improvements (Kilmer, Caulkins, Bond & Reuter, 2010). The lack of 
substantive evidence to support the conclusions made in these reports allows individuals to 
question the veracity of their results. Providing a glimpse into their methodology, the 
RCMP (2010) revealed that their findings primarily rely on seizure data. However, in 
addition to lack of detail that was provided for this source (they only state that seizure data 
was used), seizure data has been criticized for not being a valid indicator of drug markets 
due to its potential to fluctuate in response to factors that are not related to or actual 
changes in the drug market, such as a single, significant seizure or shifts in law 
enforcement priorities (Bouchard et al, 2011). To begin with police seizures inform us of 
police strategies and thus the activities of these authorities, rather than actual market 
behaviour. Seizure data may vary in tandem with shifts in law enforcement priorities, 
indicating enhanced police targeting and funding, rather than increases in production 
(Bouchard et al, 2011). While it may be alleged that seizure data taken from a wide array of 
regions will compensate for different law enforcement mandates and thus provide a 
reflective picture of the overall drug market, as the report did not indicate the sources of 
this data we are unable to assess whether the findings reflect actual trends in the market. In 
addition, it is important to emphasize that the overall sizes of annual seizures may be 
influenced by a single significant seizure, reflecting one large consignment rather than any 
significant structural change in the overall market (Bouchard et al, 2011).  
In contrast to these reports, a recent multi-site European study has emphasized a 
competitive and ephemeral synthetic drug market (Gruppo Abele, 2003). Over a three year 
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period, research teams analyzed three European synthetic drug markets; Barcelona 
(Montañes, Barruti, Pallarés & Domínguez, 2003), Amsterdam (Blickman, Korf, Siegel & 
Zaitch, 2003), and Turin (Massari, Mareso, Monzini & Veglio, 2003). Applying a 
multifaceted approach that relied primarily on qualitative research tools, including 
interviews with police officers and drug traffickers, they established that many groups 
operated in a loosely structured, flexible, and decentralized market, with few barriers to 
entry or exit. Their research was highly valuable as two of the drug markets they observed 
were at different stages of development; allowing them to make distinctions and learn about 
variations in structure. A young market, Spain, consisted primarily of small amateur labs 
that manufactured a relatively small amount of pills destined for local consumption 
(Montañes et al, 2003). In contrast, the Netherlands had developed into a more 
professionalized market that consisted of small groups and a network structure that relied 
on the outsourcing of specialists, such as chemists and individuals involved in the trade of 
precursors (Blickman et al, 2003). Regardless of degree of professionalization their 
research allowed them to determine that all three markets were highly adaptable and an 
“extremely fluid and multifaceted phenomena” (Gruppo Abele, 2003, p. 223).  
Although this latter report provides an extensive analysis of the synthetic drug 
market, the primary method to investigate the synthetic drug market by the Gruppo Abele 
was through the use of interviews with active, former, and indirect participants involved in 
the illicit trade. While this method provides a technique to learn more about the structure 
through insider accounts of the drug markets, these sources may only provide partial or 
misinformed accounts and thus misrepresent the sphere and characteristics of the drug 
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market as a whole. In addition, these methods primarily relied on data obtained at the retail 
level, not allowing us to see the higher level, and thus more influential, actors in the market. 
To overcome these limitations in their data, quantitative data was also obtained to examine 
the market, although to a lesser extent. The report concluded by emphasizing the necessity 
of further studying the market in this and other regional and global contexts.  
While research on illicit markets rely primarily on traditional sources, including 
both direct and peripheral actors in the drug trade for insight, few researchers have turned 
to the central component of the drug market; the drugs themselves as a unit of analysis. 
Drugs are frequently seized through law enforcement procedures however, given police and 
judicial mandates, their use often ends as a justification for arrest and court room evidence. 
With the aid of chemical extraction, these seized drugs can also serve another purpose 
providing forensic intelligence to gain reliable insight into the structural characteristics and 
organizational attributes of the drug market. Using seized drugs, specifically drug 
composition data, as the basis of the current research, this study will assess the structural 
features of the Quebec synthetic drug market, providing a rare glimpse into the social 
organization of covert drug manufacturers. In addition, drug prices, a fundamental 
component of the market, will also be incorporated to assess this market. These prices will 
be merged with the drug composition data to provide a more comprehensive understanding 
of the market’s dynamics and structural features. 
Drug composition analysis uses seized drugs to assess illicit market features. This 
method relies on the central component of the market, the drugs themselves, as the central 
unit of analysis, bypassing methodological limitations inherent in using illicit actors to 
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assess the market. Drug composition analysis examines the drug’s chemical makeup and 
physical properties to make inferences about the market structure. Given the diversity of 
synthetic drugs, the variety of production methods, the organic impurities that are formed at 
different stages of the synthesis process, an infinite number of cutting agents, and numerous 
settings on pressing devices each synthetic drug is presumed to carry a unique profile based 
on its physical attributes (e.g. colour and logo) and chemical characteristics (the number of 
and concentration of different substances present in the tablet).  It is assumed that these 
characteristics are unique to each producer and can be used to identify batches of 
synthesized drugs, serving as an identifying personal signature.  
After the first step in data composition analysis, the extraction of the drug’s 
chemical profile and systematic measurements of its physical profile by trained chemists, 
the data can be analyzed to identify drugs that share chemical compositions and physical 
features. Drugs produced by the same manufacturer can be identified by linking drugs with 
similar characteristics (tablets with the same concentration of active substances and organic 
impurities or physical features). By grouping drugs with similar profiles it allows us to 
examine the number of producers in a given area, the output of a given manufacturer, 
trends in production methods, and distribution networks, revealing the organizational 
characteristics and structural attributes of the market. Based on the aforementioned 
premise, that each drug carries the manufacturer’s unique signature, if the combined seizure 
data indicates numerous and different tablets, this may suggest the presence of a 
competitive market where multiple, independent producers or small groups are responsible 
for the synthetic drug market. If the results reveal a high percentage of similar tablets, it 
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may indicate a monopolistic and centralized market where only a few players or groups are 
responsible for the majority of drug production. Thus, this method allows us to assess the 
market using an accessible unit of analysis, the drugs themselves, to provide a rare glimpse 
into the structure and social organization of drug manufacturers. 
Providing a framework on how to reliably use drug composition data to analyze 
illicit drug markets has been extensive research in Europe. In particular a project funded by 
the European Commission, the Collaborative Harmonisation of Methods for Profiling of 
Amphetamine Type Stimulants (CHAMP), has significantly contributed to the development 
of advanced techniques to extract drugs’ chemical and physical profiles and methods to 
apply this information into a drug intelligence context. In attempts to create harmonized 
profiling methods and a common drug database, these researchers have conducted 
numerous studies to analyze links between seizures (Weyermann et al, 2008). Two 
particularly relevant studies, taking the two separate stages of production into account 
examined individually the ability of organic impurities (Weyermann et al, 2008) and 
physical features (Marquis et al, 2008) to discriminate both between and within seizures.  
The first study examined the organic impurities that are created during synthesis 
from a sample of 26 MDMA seizures obtained from Finland and Germany in addition to 80 
MDMA tablets that were collected from seizures by laboratories in Finland, Netherlands, 
France, and Switzerland (Weyermann et al, 2008). The researchers used a gas 
chromatography spectrometry method, developed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute 
(NFI), to extract the tablets chemical profile and used a fixed correlation value to determine 
whether drugs’ profiles were linked or not. Using this statistical test, researchers 
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demonstrated that organic impurities could be used to establish connections within seizures 
and distinguish between seizure batches (Weyermann et al, 2008). These findings 
demonstrated the potential of statistical tools to illustrate links between drugs.  The second 
study, which examined tablets’ physical characteristics, using the squared Euclidean or the 
Manhattan distance, determined that diameter, thickness, weight and score of the drug were 
all reliable characteristics to distinguish between drugs from different seizures. The 
findings allowed researcher to conclude that the drug’s physical properties brings 
complementary information to the organic impurity analysis (Marquis et al, 2008). 
However, given that two separate tableting machines with the same settings can produce 
similar physical characteristics it was emphasized that physical characteristics should be 
used in tandem with other information for more accurate interpretations (Marquis et al, 
2008). 
Further research has provided a model for practical applications of drug 
composition analysis, including studies that have categorized and identified links between 
heroin (Dujourdy et al, 2003; Esseiva et al, 2007) and synthetic drug (Zingg, 2005) 
seizures. These studies detail how to assess the illegal synthetic drug market by analyzing 
links between drugs with shared compositions and physical attributes. Using seizure data 
obtained over six years researchers extracted and analyzed the physical and chemical 
profiles from 67 different heroin seizures, identifying 34 chemical groups. Linking drugs 
according to a fixed correlation value, their findings determined that the heroin market may 
consist of fewer producers relative to the cocaine market (Esseiva et al, 2007).  Applying 
this method to the synthetic drug market Zingg (2005) analyzed 1000 synthetic drugs 
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seized from 1997 to 2000. Based off his analysis Zingg (2005) found a high number of 
distinct profiles, implying a high number of producers in the market. The practical 
application of this method demonstrates its utility in assessing the organization of 
clandestine markets. 
A further method to analyze the synthetic drug industry is through an economic analysis. 
The core data source of this analysis are prices, which are a basic element of the market and 
can reveal the economic forces and factors at work in illicit enterprises. Drug prices are a 
valued research tool to analyze illegal drug industries, as they are a fundamental component 
of drug markets (Caulkins & Reuter, 1996; Caulkins & Baker, 2010). As we know little 
about the synthetic drug market we also know little about price variations therein and the 
factors that account for such price variations. Price data has been used extensively to 
inform drug policies and provide insights about drug markets, including the effectiveness of 
law enforcement interventions (Caulkins & Reuter, 2010) and to monitor changes in the 
structure of illicit drug markets (Rhodes, Hyatt & Scheiman, 1994). These studies rely 
primarily on price oscillations over time to make inferences about changes in the drug 
market. However, to reliably use price data to analyze illegal drug markets, it is essential 
that the determinants of illicit drug prices are comprehensively understood; otherwise we 
risk making faulty conclusions and attributing price fluctuations to unrelated factors. In 
addition knowledge of the determinants of these price variations can provide information 
about the internal dynamics of the illicit market, revealing production costs, behavioural 
trends, market structure, consumer trends, demand and supply and other factors that lead to 
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the final setting of prices. Currently there is a lack of empirical knowledge about synthetic 
drug markets, particularly in regards to their price determinants.  
Determinants of Illegal Drug Prices 
Multiple factors influence the amount that illicit drugs are sold for. Drug markets 
are influenced by both the same economic rules as legal markets as well as unique factors 
associated with operating in an illegal market. To begin with, drug prices are governed by 
similar market forces as legal commodities (Reuter & Haaga, 1989; Pietschmann, 1997; 
Ritter, 2006), complying with basic economic supply and demand principles (Ritter, 2006).  
In its most basic form, changes in the market are reflected in the supply or demand of a 
commodity, which subsequently impacts its price. Price changes occur to restore market 
equilibrium, where supply equals demand, so as to regulate product shortages or excesses 
(Moore et al, 2005).   
Although drugs comply with some of the same principles as legal goods, current 
prices of illicit drugs are significantly higher than if they were sold in the legal market 
(Reuter & Kleiman, 1986; Moore, 1990; Miron & Zwiebel, 1995). To account for these 
price disparities are additional distinct factors, tied to their illegality, which also influence 
their retail price (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998). While operating in an illegal market reduces 
some costs associated with running an enterprise, additional risks are incurred by the 
product’s criminality and significantly increases risk expenses including violence, risk of 
arrest, and judicial costs (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998). These additional risks significantly 
hike transaction costs and subsequently the drugs final retail price. Despite extensive 
studies on the determinants of drug prices, few have examined the factors that influence the 
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retail cost of synthetic drugs. Knowledge of these factors can reveal information about the 
inner dynamics that characterize this clandestine market. 
Analytical Scheme 
Aiming to provide a comprehensive picture of the structural attributes of Quebec’s 
synthetic drug market, this study will proceed in three steps. First a network analysis using 
the drug composition data will identify links between drugs with shared characteristics, 
providing a detailed description of the market’s structure. Building off these findings, a 
cluster analysis will be conducted to statistically model these structural features and provide 
for the creation of a structural variable for the final economic analysis. Lastly, the price 
data will be incorporated to examine how this structural variable and other market 
indicators influence price variations across the province. In sum, this study will allow us to 
examine the industry at both the retail level, through an analysis of price determinants, and 
the production level, through the composition of the drugs that manufacturers produce, 
providing for a comprehensive analysis of the market’s features.  
Sources of Synthetic Drug Tablets  
This study relies on 365 synthetic drugs that were obtained through a project 
commissioned by the federal government in response to concern over increased use of 
synthetic drugs. In partnership with the provincial and municipal police forces in Quebec a 
sample of seizures made by law enforcement agencies in Quebec between June 2007 and 
2008were analyzed by Health Canada who extracted and systematically classified the 
synthetic drugs into categories based on their chemical composition (active substance and 
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cutting agents) and physical features (score, colour, and logo). Among these tablets, there 
were four major active substances (MDMA, MDA, methamphetamine, and amphetamine), 
and over forty adulterants, cutting agents, and/or by products of the chemical reactions. The 
wide range of tablets with different chemical compositions was also consistent with their 
physical characteristics, which contained both a high number of different logos (n= 122) 
and colors (n=12).  All the synthetic drugs in this sample were seized in nine different areas 
across the Quebec province: Abitibi-Temiscamingue, Bas Saint-Laurent, Cote-Nord, Estrie, 
Gaspesie, Mauricie, Montreal, Outaouais, and Quebec. This information provides us with 
valuable information on potential regional differences and a more representative picture of 
the Quebec province, reflecting both small remote regions and densely populated urban 
centres. 
Additional information regarding the context and details of the seized drug in this 
sample was also supplied from law enforcement investigative files, which included whether 
the drug trafficker was selling his/her product as ecstasy or speed, irrespective of the actual 
composition and the retail price of the drug. The majority of drugs were sold as speed 
(n=244; 66.8%) and under one quarter as ecstasy (n=88; 24.1%). Prices of drugs in the 
Quebec province ranged from a minimum of two dollars and fifty cents Canadian to a 
maximum of twenty dollars with the majority being sold for ten dollars (n=133). In addition 
prices are relatively similar across the different regions. On average prices are slightly 
higher in Montreal, $9.82 and have a higher minimum price of $5.00, than in comparison to 
the rest of Quebec, with an average price of $8.72 and a minimum price of $2.50. This 
large variance in drug prices allows us to examine whether a drug’s quality and brand or 
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whether a drug traffickers sells his product as ecstasy or speed influences the drug’s final 
price. As prices were obtained only for 261 of the drugs, this subsample will comprise the 
economic analysis. The prices obtained in this seizure closely resemble prices of ecstasy in 
other Western regions across Europe. The 2011 Annual Report by the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Addiction (EMCDDA) stated that in the majority of countries ecstasy 
retail prices varied between EUR $4-9. Also closely following the prices in this analysis 
were prices found in the UK ecstasy market, which observed that the average price of a 
tablet in 2003 cost approximately £5.30 (Schifano et al, 2006). 
Providing a model to utilize drug composition data as an intelligence tool is 
extensive research that outlines statistical methods to determine whether drugs originate 
from the same production batch (Dujourdy et al, 2003; Esseiva et al, 2003; Zingg, 2005; 
Anderson et al, 2007; Esseiva et al, 2007; Weyermann et al, 2008; Marquis et al, 2008; 
Esseiva et al, 2011). These studies found that the pearson correlation serves as the most 
reliable statistical tool to determine cutting points at which drugs with shared characteristics 
belong to the same manufacturer. In these studies researchers link drugs based on detailed 
information including the quantity and concentration of each substance present in each 
tablet (Esseiva et al, 2003; Zingg, 2005; Anderson et al, 2007). However, contrary to this 
research, the data in the current study does not provide the percentage of each ingredient, 
precluding us from adopting the pearson correlation. Given the aims of the above project  
this level of chemical analysis was not integrated into data that was shared with us, and it 
was exceptional that we were able to receive any information in regard to the composition 
of the tablets. Accounting for the differences in data, the analysis procedures were adapted 
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accordingly, substituting the pearson correlation with network analysis to overcome this 
limitation. 
Profiling the Synthetic Drug Market 
The network analysis permitted a detailed view of the drug’s composition and 
physical attributes and how they were directly connected according to these features. From 
the analysis, eighty different chemical compositions were identified among the 365 seized 
synthetic drugs, each tablet a different combination of the active substance(s) and/or cutting 
agent(s). The most popular tablet in the sample contained methamphetamine and caffeine 
(n=100), comprising 27.4% of all seized synthetic drugs. Other popular profiles included 
MDMA (n=18), MDA (n=19), and methamphetamine (n=27). The wide range of tablets 
with different chemical compositions was also consistent with their physical characteristics, 
which contained both a high number of different logos and colours. Of the 122 different 
logos in the sample, the most popular were a symbol of a “star” and “on star”, which both, 
individually, accounted for 3.8% (n=14) of all drugs. The drugs were one of twelve 
different colours, the most prevalent being white (n=224). 
A drug’s logo and colour rarely indicated the drug’s chemical composition; tablets 
that shared the same physical appearance frequently represented two different chemical 
compositions. An analysis of the chemical compositions for the tablets did not demonstrate 
any patterns into how the logos were selected. Most logos appeared once in the sample, 
with only 65 of the 122 logos appearing two or more times. A small fraction of all the 
tablets, 16 groups in total ranging from a minimum of two to a maximum of six tablets, 
were identified as sharing both the same physical appearance and chemical composition. 
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With the exception of the above mentioned 48 tablets, divided into 16 groups, drugs that 
shared chemical compositions had a high number of different physical features. Among all 
tablets that exclusively contained methamphetamine and cocaine (n=100) they carried 41 
different logos. In this sample, a tablet’s colour and logo were rarely exclusive to a tablet’s 
chemical composition. This may reflect that the two stages of synthetic drug manufacturing 
process, the pre-tabletting stage, which involves the chemical synthesis of the active 
substance, and the post-tabletting stage, the compression of the powder into tablet form, are 
being conducted in different locations and reflect separate actors. 
Further deception was also detected in the synthetic drug market through an 
examination of the contents of the drugs sold as ecstasy or speed. Only 43% of the drugs 
sold as ecstasy and 66% of the drugs sold as speed contained the active substance that they 
were being sold as. This deception in the synthetic drug market is commonly observed, as 
toxicoepidemiologic monitoring of illegal street drugs has shown that substances marketed 
as ecstasy or speed can contain a wide variety of compounds and frequently do not contain 
the active ingredient (Spruit, 2001; Cole et al, 2002; Parrott, 2003).  
Drug profiles within each region were also observed to be heterogeneous. All the 
regions consisted of a wide array of tablets with varying chemical compositions and 
physical properties. Montreal had the lowest variability among tablets with a total of 35 
tablets with different chemical compositions for the total 124 seized drugs in the area. 
Mauricie had the greatest within region variability with 19 tablets that carried distinct 
chemical compositions out of the total 25 sampled drugs. This same trend was also 
reflected when examining the tablet’s physical characteristics, with seizures in each region 
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possessing a high number of different logos. Within each of the nine different regions 
approximately half of all tablets sampled possessed different logos. Drugs seized in 
Saguenay possessed the most homogenous physical features with just under half of all 
drugs possessing different logos, 20 logos for the total of 41 sampled tablets. The most 
extreme variability was observed in Mauricie with almost all drugs carrying different logos, 
21 logos for the 24 tablets.  
To characterize the structure of the network using the 365 drug profiles, two 
cohesion analysis tools, density and clustering coefficient, were conducted using a network 
analysis software program, UCInet.  Density provides an overall analysis of the degree of 
connectivity of a network between subjects, while the clustering coefficient identifies the 
degree of local clusters in the network, examining the degree of connectivity between one 
tablet to all the tablets directly linked to it. Both methods are recommended to be applied as 
group size may influence the clustering coefficient, with larger samples reducing the 
coefficient (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). This sample contained high connectivity with a 
density at 61% and a clustering coefficient at 83%. Accounting for this high density, within 
a sample with a high number of different (drugs with different compositions and physical 
features), were that most tablets could be linked based on one or two shared characteristics. 
In this sample most drugs contained either methamphetamine (n=208) or caffeine (n=222). 
However, of these tablets, most contained additional adulterants (e.g. diphenhydramine or 
dimethylsulfone), making it distinct from the others. Further distinguishing tablets from one 
another, were the wide array of physical characteristics. Although the majority of tablets in 
this sample were white, there were 122 different logos for the 365 tablets. Therefore even 
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though many drugs shared a few similar chemical characteristics, few also shared the same 
physical appearance. When the drug’s physical and chemical features were looked at 
collectively, there was high variability between tablets, with only 48 drugs (13%) 
possessing identical characteristics with one or more tablet.  
The Structural Features of the Market  
The second step in the assessment of the market’s structural features was a cluster 
analysis. Although this method performs the same assessment of the market as the network 
analysis (they both organize the drugs into groups according to shared properties) it was 
also incorporated into the research design as it served two additional purposes: (1) it 
allowed for a statistical demonstration that empirically validates the relationships from the 
above descriptive analysis; and (2) it provided for the creation of a dependent variable that 
reflects the structural features of the market. However, due to the nature of the data, the 
cluster analysis provided less detail of the market’s features, as the high variation in 
chemical and physical drug profiles meant some variables had to be regrouped into larger 
categories or eliminated in order to affect a reliable cluster analysis. Thus, within the 
framework of this study, the cluster analysis served a practical objective, aforementioned, 
while the network analysis served to provide more detail about the characteristics that link 
the drugs, and thus insight into the structure of the market. 
For the cluster analysis, It was determined that the chemical variables’ values would 
be regrouped according to quality, allowing for the preservation of some detail of the data, 
while variables that described the physical characteristics of the synthetic drugs with low 
frequencies had to be eliminated, as they could not be assimilated into larger categories. For 
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the regrouping of the chemical variables, quality was determined based on the drug’s level 
of purity; whether the synthetic tablet only contained active stimulant ingredient(s) (either 
amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA or MDA), or whether its purity had been 
contaminated with cutting agent(s). After consulting toxicology and pharmacology 
reference books, these criteria permitted the identification of three groups, Grade A, Grade 
B, and Grade C Drugs (Ebadi, 2008; Barceloux, 2012); Grade A Drugs were considered the 
highest quality drugs, consisting only of the active ingredient (e.g. MDMA), Grade B 
Drugs, were deemed medium quality drugs, consisting of one active ingredient and one or 
more cutting agents (e.g. MDMA and caffeine), and Grade C Drugs the lowest quality 
tablets, composed exclusively of one or more cutting agents (e.g. caffeine). Ten drugs were 
excluded from the analysis, as they did not meet the criteria (e.g. one tablet solely contained 
psilocybine, the active ingredient found in mushrooms). To ensure the correct classification 
of the seized drugs into their appropriate categories they were also verified by a professor 
of neuro-pharmacology at the Université de Montréal
1
. However, given that the data did not 
provide information about the concentration of each substance caution should be exercised 
when interpreting these groups, as it is possible that a tablet designated as a Grade A drug 
has a very low purity with 95% cutting agent and 5% active ingredient. Based on the above 
classification, synthetic drugs in the Quebec market consisted primarily of Grade B Drugs 
(n=227), followed by Grade A Drugs (n=71), and Grade C Drugs (n=57). 
Second, it was necessary to narrow the more than 107 values that characterize the 
physical and visual characteristics of synthetic drugs (each a descriptor of the drug’s 
quality, colour or logo) to include only the variables that had a frequency of three or more. 
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Only seven of the drugs’ possible twelve colours and 20 of the 93 logos were included. The 
rational for choosing only a fraction of all the colours and logos was empirical, as all 
variables had to have a sufficient number of cases (n=3) to effect a reliable analysis; 
variables that had low frequencies (e.g. the american airlines logo with a frequency of one) 
were not included. Given the  above considerations, the clustering variables include the 
following: the drug’s quality (Grade A, Grade B, and Grade C Drugs), colour (white, blue, 
yellow, mauve, orange, pink, and green), and logo (bomb, capsule, heart, couche-tard, e, 
lightning bolt, star, kärv, mercedes, MSN, on star, pepsi, pinup, 7up, playboy, puma, shell 
V power, transformers, versace and no logo).  
Incorporating the concise list of variables into the analysis, four distinct clusters 
emerged. Findings were similar to the network analysis, with a wide array of physical 
characteristics being shared among a high range of drugs with different compositions. The 
most distinctive feature that divided each cluster was its quality. One cluster grouped Grade 
A Drugs, two grouped Grade B Drugs, and one grouped Grade C Drugs, permitting us to 
assess which logos and colours are most likely to be associated with drugs of different 
quality. Table 1 (below) demonstrates the division into four clusters and the characteristics 
of each drug according to the categories. The findings from the cluster analysis can be 
summarized as follows. 
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Table 1: Distinctions between Clusters 
 
Variable Cluster 1  (%) Cluster 2 (%) 
 
Cluster 3 
(%) 
Cluster 4 
(%) 
Chi2 sig. 
Grade A 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .000 
Grade B 0.0 99.0 100.0 0.0 .000 
Grade C 0.0 1.0 0.0 99.0 .000 
Bomb 0.0 3.0 2.9 0.0 .252 
Capsule 1.4 1.0 0.0 7.0 .006 
Heart 4.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 .060 
Couche Tard 5.6 0.0 3.6 1.7 .151 
E 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 .000 
Lightning Bolt 1.4 1.0 2.9 0.0 .479 
Star 1.4 11.0 2.9 0.0 .001 
Kärv 0.0 1.0 2.9 0.0 .242 
Mercedes 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 .043 
MSN 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 .002 
On Star 4.0 0.0 6.6 1.7 .058 
Pepsi 5.6 0.0 1.4 0.0 .026 
Pin up 4.0 2.0 5.0 0.0 .281 
Playboy 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.0 .000 
Puma 0.0 4.0 1.4 0.0 .105 
7up 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 .043 
Shell V Power 2.8 0.0 2.9 0.0 .224 
Transformers 1.4 6.5 0.0 0.0 .003 
Versace 4.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 .147 
No logo 12.6 21.4 0.0 7.0 .001 
White 59.1 4.3 100.0 64.2 .000 
Blue 5.6 14.1 0.0 5.3 .000 
Yellow 1.4 10.8 0.0 8.9 .000 
Mauve 1.4 11.9 0.0 0.0 .000 
Orange 4.2 9.7 0.0 8.9 .003 
Pink 18.3 32.6 0.0 3.5 .000 
Green 2.8 9.7 0.0 1.7 .001 
 
Cluster 1, or Grade A Drugs (consist only of the active substance), possessed a high 
number of different logos, the most popular being the letter “e” (8.5%), followed by couche 
tard (5.6%), and pepsi (5.6%). Other drug logos included capsule, heart, lightning bolt, 
star, versace, pinup, on star and shell v power. However, all logos that characterized Grade 
A Drugs were also shared with drugs of lower quality, with the exception of the logo “e”, 
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which was observed exclusively within Grade A Drugs. Furthermore, all possible colours 
present in the sample were observed among Grade A Drugs; the most popular being white 
(59.1%), followed by pink (18.3%) and blue (5.6%). Thus, a drug’s logo and colour is 
rarely indicative of the drug’s quality. While some logos and colours have a higher 
likelihood of being associated with Grade A Drugs, they may also represent a different 
quality drug.  
Turning to Cluster 2, Grade B Drugs also contained a high number of different 
logos, with the most popular being star (11%). Many of the same logos as Grade A Drugs, 
including capsule, heart, lightning bolt, star, pinup, transformers, and versace were shared 
with Grade B Drugs. In addition, Grade B Drugs could be any of the seven possible colours 
(white, blue, yellow, mauve orange, pink and green). However, in contrast to Grade A 
Drugs, the most popular colours among Grade B Drugs were pink (32.6%), mauve (11.9%) 
and yellow (10.8%). 
Both the second and third clusters were composed exclusively of Grade B Drugs, 
having been divided between the two clusters. However, the second group of Grade B 
Drugs was distinct from the first in that it was composed exclusively of white pills. 
Furthermore, an analysis of their chemical compositions demonstrated that among the 
Grade B Drugs in the third cluster, they were composed primarily of methamphetamine and 
caffeine, while the drugs in the second cluster had a high number of different chemical 
profiles. Both clusters also shared many of the same logos, including bomb, lightning bolt, 
star, karv, pin up, puma, and versace. However, the most popular logos in cluster three 
were playboy (8.8%) and on star (6.6%).  
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The fourth cluster, Grade C Drugs had a low number of logos; consisting only of 
four different logos in total: capsule (7%), couche tard (1.7%), on star (1.7%) or no logo 
(7%). The few logos present in this cluster may be explained by the fact that many logos 
were excluded from the cluster analysis, as they had too low of a frequency. Similar to the 
first two clusters, Grade C Drugs contained all possible colours, with the exception of 
mauve. The most popular colour was white (64.2%), distantly followed by yellow (8.9%), 
and orange (8.9%). Across both the descriptive and the cluster analysis consistency is found 
in the large overlap of shared characteristics between drugs. For the remainder of the paper, 
for clarity purposes, these cluster groups will be referred to according to their quality, e.g. 
either as Grade A, Grade B Coloured, Grade B White Drugs, or Grade C Drugs. 
Factors that Influence Synthetic Drug Prices 
Following the regrouping of variables into clusters, an ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the influence of the structural variable and the marketing variable (whether the 
drug was being sold as ecstasy or speed) on the drug’s price. First, an ANOVA was 
conducted on the entire province to provide a comprehensive portrait of price determinants 
at the provincial level. Following this, a second comparative analysis was conducted using 
two separate ANOVA tests to compare the determinants of drug prices in Montreal (n=108) 
to the rest of Quebec (n=153), allowing for insight into geographical variations of price 
determinants. These two regions were selected based off the data and the number of 
seizures made in each area required to effect reliable comparisons. 
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Quebec 
Based on the outcome of the ANOVA analysis for Quebec’s synthetic drug prices, 
one can understand that there is a statistically significant difference between prices for both 
the cluster variable (p<.05) and whether it was sold as ecstasy or speed (p<.01). Both these 
variables account for 10% of synthetic drug price variation for the Quebec province. A 
larger effect resulted in whether it was being sold as ecstasy or speed (F=8.417) in 
comparison to the cluster variable (F=3.354). The interaction effect between the cluster and 
marketing variable was not statistically significant (p>.05).  
Table 2 below presents the results of the ANOVA analysis. A few unanticipated 
relationships were borne out of the data for the cluster variable.  Grade B Coloured Drugs 
and Grade B White Drugs were sold for the highest prices; Grade B Coloured Drugs sold 
on average for $10.88 and Grade B White Drugs sold for $10.36. In contrast, Grade A 
Drugs were sold for approximately two dollars less ($8.81). In addition, the differential in 
prices between Grade A and Grade C Drugs were marginal with Grade C Drugs selling for 
a similar price as Grade A Drugs, at $8.58. 
Furthermore, it was also found that drugs which were sold as ecstasy cost 
approximately two dollars more than if they had been sold as speed (respectively, $10.59 
versus $8.73). This may support that drug users are inclined to trust dealers and pay higher 
prices based on information derived from these players. Supporting this, is the fact that 
ecstasy is deemed to be a more expensive and better quality drug, involving more elaborate 
production methods and higher skilled manufacturers. 
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Table 2: Price Determinants of Synthetic Drugs for the Quebec Province 
 
Montreal 
ANOVA results for cases within the Montreal region indicated that there was a 
significant difference between prices depending on whether it was being sold as ecstasy or 
speed (F=4.456, p<.05). However, in contrast to ANOVA results for the entire Quebec 
province, the results sustained that the cluster variable was not statistically significant at the 
.05 level (F=1.693, p>.05), as illustrated in Table 3. Thus, the drug’s quality did not play a 
role in influencing the drug’s price in Montreal. The marketing variable, whether it was 
being sold as ecstasy or speed, explained 14.3% of synthetic drug price variation in the 
Montreal region. Consistent with the ANOVA for the province, ecstasy was sold for a 
higher price ($11.17) and speed for approximately two dollars less ($9.36). Consequently, 
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we may also conclude that in Montreal drug users may be more inclined to trust the dealer 
and pay higher prices based on information derived from these players.  
Table 3: Price Determinants of Synthetic Drugs in Montreal 
 
The Province of Quebec outside Montreal 
For comparative purposes, an ANOVA was also conducted to examine the 
determinants of prices for the rest of Quebec outside Montreal. The results of the ANOVA 
sustained that there was a significant difference, albeit weak, between prices for the cluster 
variable (F= 2.708, p<.05), but not for the marketing variable (F= 2.367, p>.05). In this 
analysis, the cluster variable explained 10.1% of synthetic drug price variation for the 
region. In contrast to all of Quebec, Grade A Drugs were the most expensive outside of 
Montreal ($10.65). Consistent with all of Quebec, Grade A and Grade C Drugs were 
similar in price, Grade C Drugs being sold on average for thirty-six cents less (at $10.29). 
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In contrast, Grade B Drugs were sold for the lowest prices; Grade B Coloured Drugs for 
$8.49 and Grade B White Drugs for $7.47. These results are displayed in Table 4. 
Table 4: Price Determinants of Synthetic Drugs for the Quebec Province Outside of Montreal 
 
Discussion 
The current study was designed to empirically examine structural features of the 
synthetic drug market by examining links between seized synthetic drugs and their price 
determinants. The first analysis demonstrated that a high number of different drugs are 
present in the market, potentially indicating a high number of manufacturers. The second 
investigation confirmed that a drug’s composition and whether the drug trafficker markets 
the drug as ecstasy or speed can marginally influence its price, depending on the region. 
This study obtained divergent results for Montreal in comparison to rest of Quebec; outside 
8.40 
10.29 
10.65 
8.49 
7.47 
10.29 
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
Speed Ecstasy Grade A Grade B
Coloured
Grade B
White
Grade C
p<0.5
p>.05
  
 
71
of Montreal prices were only influenced by quality, while prices sold in Montreal were only 
influenced by whether it was marketed as ecstasy or speed. 
Evidence of a Competitive Market 
The high density reported from the network analysis represents the high number of 
profiles that share one or two of the same ingredients. Based on this data, it may be argued 
that due to the similarities between profiles and higher frequency of some profiles over 
others (e.g. methamphetamine and caffeine tablets comprise 27.4% of seizures) some 
manufacturers have a significantly larger market share than others. Although this inference 
follows from the logic expressed above, the ubiquity of these ingredients and the high 
number of different combinations of these ingredients in this sample causes us to lean 
towards an alternative interpretation. First, the most prevalent profile and substances in the 
sample consists of two very common ingredients, methamphetamine and caffeine. Given 
the ease with which caffeine can be obtained and that most synthesis procedures aim to 
produce methamphetamine, it is likely that multiple manufacturers are producing a similar 
product that contains both these ingredients, indicating multiple synthetic drug producers. 
In addition, there are a high number of different chemical profiles, eighty in total also 
suggesting a high number of producers. These findings are further supported by the 
descriptive analysis, which demonstrated that each region in this sample carried a wide 
array of tablets with different chemical compositions and physical features. However, due 
to the small sample sizes per region it is important to emphasize that tablets seized in each 
region may reflect only a small subset of local production or specific producers. 
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Further supporting a competitive market, of the drugs that share the same chemical 
makeup, few of these also possess the same physical characteristics. Very few tablets 
shared both the same physical and chemical features with another tablet. The largest group 
of tablets that shared identical physical and chemical attributes consisted only of six tablets. 
Assuming that the manufacturer consistently presses their tablets with the same logo, this 
supports the earlier conclusion that there are a high number of drug manufacturers. 
Previous research suggests that manufacturers may be unlikely to use multiple different 
logos, as logos may be strategically used to build brand loyalty among their consumer base 
(Karch, 2011). As consumers begin to associate a logo with a high quality drug it is 
suggested that they will attempt to obtain drugs with that same logo the following purchase 
(Karch, 2011).However, concern should be exercised, as logos may be duplicated by others 
to deceive consumers into believing they have purchased a higher quality product or simply 
separate actors producing the physical features of the tablet in a post-tabletting phase of 
production.  
It is also important to note a further limitation with these interpretations. As the 
drug composition data in this sample lacks detailed information only providing us with 
information on  the contents of each tablet and not the respective concentration of each 
substance, we risk inferring that all tablets that contain both MDMA and caffeine came 
from the same production batch when in fact each tablet has different quantities of each 
substance, which would indicate multiple manufacturers. To minimize this possibility all 
physical and chemical features of the tablet were taken into account when making links 
between drugs that came from the same origin. Thus, drugs that shared the highest number 
  
 
73
of characteristics also had the highest likelihood of originating from the same manufacturer. 
The data source used in this study is in contrast to research conducted by Esseiva et al 
(2003), Esseiva et al (2007), and Zingg (2005) who performed highly sophisticated 
extraction methods that recorded precisely the amount of each substance present in the 
seized drug, providing more accurate links between drugs with shared characteristics.  
In addition to the aforementioned limitation, this study hinges on a few principle 
assumptions, the primary being the premise that manufacturers consistently use the same 
recipe and methods. Very little research has explored the synthetic drug market and it has 
not been established that manufacturers consistently produce the same tablets. Due to this 
we risk concluding that there are multiple producers operating in the synthetic drug market 
in cases where there are a large number of distinct profiles present, when in fact it may only 
be one producer altering his manufacturing process.  
Price Analysis Discussion 
Moving to the price data, the drug’s quality, as determined by the cluster variable, 
was deemed to have a statistically significant, albeit weak, effect on prices for the province 
as a whole and for the region outside Montreal. However, this cluster variable exerted a 
different effect on prices for these two geographical areas. When Montreal was excluded 
from the analysis drugs of higher quality were sold for higher prices, with the exception of 
Grade C Drugs (drugs with no active ingredient were more expensive than Grade B Drugs). 
Although initially counterintuitive that lower quality drugs are more expensive, given 
research that has demonstrated that cocaine users perceive low prices to be indicative of 
poor quality (Evrard, Legleye & Cadet-Taïrou, 2010), it is logical that traffickers in efforts 
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to deceive customers would sell these drugs at elevated prices. However, in contrast, when 
examining Quebec as a whole, medium quality drugs (Grade B Drugs) are sold for the 
highest price, followed by high quality (Grade A Drugs), and low quality (Grade C Drugs). 
It is notable that higher quality is associated with higher prices only in the province of 
Quebec when Montreal is excluded, and that prices are not correlated with a drug’s quality 
within the Montreal market.  
 Trafficker-Consumer Relations 
This contrast between Montreal and the rest of Quebec may be attributed to two 
scenarios; the market structure and differential production costs. In regard to the market 
structure outside of Montreal, prices may be influenced by a drug’s quality because of 
trafficker-consumer relations. Traffickers in attempts to obtain return customers have 
provided reliable, valuable information about their products to increase trust and future 
sales. Although it is unlikely that a trafficker will disclose to a user that a drug contains no 
active ingredient, traffickers may accommodate users by presenting drugs at different prices 
depending on what they can afford, leaving the decision with the user on whether to 
purchase a higher or lower quality drug. In contrast, in Montreal, fewer incentives may be 
in place for traffickers to develop a strong customer base through trusting relationships, as 
there may be a higher demand for drugs and therefore traffickers may be less inclined to 
obtain a regular clientele, with new customers always looking to buy the product. Indeed, 
the notion that ‘there’s a sucker born every minute’ may be more in tune with a dense urban 
population that makes it more difficult for consumers to keep suppliers in check. However, 
that drug traffickers in Montreal are more likely to sell to people they don’t know is 
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inconsistent with higher quality drugs being sold for less in this city, which would imply 
that dealers provide lower prices to individuals they know. This may be explained by the 
limitations in sample size, which did not find quality to statistically significantly influence 
price determinants in Montreal, with most drugs sold as Grade B (65%) and only a small 
fraction as Grade A (25%) and Grade C (10%). 
 Production Costs 
The discrepancy on how the drug’s quality influences prices in different regions 
may also be explained by looking at production costs.  Research on illicit drug markets has 
stated that a drug’s quality rarely influences its final price when production costs are 
insignificant, forming only a fraction of the retail price (Reuter & Caulkins, 2012). For 
example, in the heroin market, the drug’s retail value is marked up by 99% from its 
wholesale cost in the country of origin (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998). Applying this to the 
current study, quality may be more inclined to be associated with a drug’s cost outside of 
Montreal because production costs are high (e.g. precursors may be purchased in smaller 
quantities and thus cost more) and play a larger role in influencing the drug’s final price. 
Thus, synthetic drug manufacturers in the Montreal region may operate out of larger 
laboratories and therefore acquire precursors in bulk, wholesale quantities, resulting in 
considerable cost reduction. As supported by the above inferences in regard trafficker-
consumer relations, drug demand may be higher in this large metropolitan area, which is 
reflected in the low accountability between dealers and users. Thus producers, faced with 
larger demand may be inclined to obtain and produce drugs in large quantities, reducing 
associated production costs. That large production facilities may be located in a dense 
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urban city contrasts with what we know of the cannabis market. Large expanses of land are 
generally required to produce wholesale quantities of cannabis, and thus production 
facilities are more likely to be located in vast, isolated expanses of land in rural areas. In 
contrast, synthetic drug production requires relatively little space to produce significant 
output, allowing for a greater mobility and the opportunity to set up near consumer markets. 
Stage of Market Development 
That the structure and distinctive features of Montreal’s synthetic drug market is 
different from the rest of Quebec was also supported by the results of the marketing 
variable. While whether it was being sold as ecstasy or speed influenced the price in 
Montreal, it did not exert a statistically significant effect for the rest of Quebec. Thus, 
consumers in Montreal were more likely to rely on what the drug trafficker stated about the 
drug, than the drug itself. This finding is consistent with other studies on illegal drug 
markets (cannabis, cocaine) that demonstrate the perceived quality of the drug is dependent 
on the information that is provided by the drug seller (Lakhdar, 2009; Evrard et al, 2010). 
This may be indicative of the presence of many first time transactions between dealers and 
sellers or may reflect the demographics of the consumers, with many new users. Novice 
consumers have little information (e.g., dealer’s reputation, familiarity with the drug) to 
rely on when making a first purchase and may not be able to distinguish between different 
“highs”, therefore indiscriminately purchasing drugs regardless of the price. As a buyer 
becomes a regular user and their education about the drug increases they may develop the 
knowledge for what to look for, who to buy it from, and how the effects should feel. Thus, 
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these more experienced users may find better quality drugs through the contacts they have 
made and the repeated use of the drug.  
Further supporting this is the “Expected Purity Hypothesis” developed by Caulkins 
(1994), which states that a key factor that influences drug prices are consumers’ perceptions 
of the drug’s potency. Given that drugs are “experience goods” purchasers are often unable 
to assess their quality until after consumption (Reuter & Caulkins, 2004; Caulkins, 2007). 
Thus, consumers, unable to evaluate the drug’s quality may rely on other factors, such as 
the drug trafficker’s reputation and statements to calculate the quality and hence the price 
they will pay, during the time of purchase.  
However, these analyses are not entirely satisfactory, as the inferences about 
relationships between suppliers and consumers are based on the assumption that the drug 
seller knows the true quality of the drug, and is therefore aware that the consumer is being 
wrongfully manipulated. There is evidence in other drug markets with long distribution 
chains that suppliers deceive traffickers further down the chain about the drug’s quality, to 
increase their respective profits (Reuter & Caulkins, 2004).  In this sense, the retail dealer is 
likely as misinformed as the consumer in regard to the commodity’s quality. A further 
limitation in this study is that due to the shortcomings of the data it was not possible to 
examine all price determinants of synthetic drugs. Thus, confounding factors may be at 
play in setting these prices. Prices may be set according to the relations between a trafficker 
and consumer; closer relationships justifying a lower price and unknown purchasers a 
higher price. In addition, a major problem to using price data is that prices fluctuate in 
regard to quantity discounts, with higher prices associated with smaller purchases and vice 
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versa (Caulkins & Padman, 1993). The current data did not detail the amount of the drug 
that was purchased at each sale not allowing us to account for this factor. More research is 
necessary to confirm the relationships between prices and structural dynamics.  
Location of Transactions 
We may also make inferences about Quebec’s synthetic drug market based on an 
analysis of the price variation. Generally, retail drug transactions are standardized and are 
made in rounded dollar amounts. This finding has been documented in illegal drug markets 
across many countries (Wendel & Curtis, 2000). Standardized drug prices generally result 
as drug sales are conducted quickly in order to avoid police detection. Producing change 
prolongs this process and consequently increases the risk of exposure to law enforcement 
(Reuter & Caulkins, 2012). However, we note that in Quebec’s synthetic drug market, 
many drugs are sold for prices that may require the production of change (e.g. $2.50, 
$7.50). This allows us to infer that some synthetic drug transactions may be conducted in 
private locations, where law enforcement detection is diminished and the luxury of making 
change can be permitted. This finding is also supported by the Gruppo Abele’s (2003) 
research that found many synthetic drug purchases were made in private dwellings.  
Conclusion 
This study aimed at bridging a knowledge gap about the structural features of the 
synthetic drug market and factors that influence synthetic drugs prices. The results of the 
analysis, albeit with limitations, provide support for a competitive perspective of the drug 
market. These findings closely follows that of earlier research that states illegal crime 
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groups operate within ephemeral and competitive structures (Block & Chambliss, 1981; 
Reuter, 1983; Haller, 1990; Potter, 1994), contrary to the claims made at the beginning of 
this paper in regard to large groups dominating Canada’s drug market. What can be 
cautiously inferred from the data in this study can assist authorities in creating more 
intelligence led and proactive programs to effectively target drug manufacturers. The 
detection and arrest of members of drug trafficking groups face many challenges and it has 
been recognized that in order to effectively accomplish this goal requires that law 
enforcement officials participate in an information exchange with numerous players, 
including forensic drug analysts (Esseiva et al, 2007). This is particularly relevant given the 
lack of research to date on the synthetic drug market and the priority that the Canadian 
government has accorded to combat the synthetic drug industry. For example, in 2009 the 
RCMP Synthetic Drug Initiative launched the first ever Canadian drug strategy to focus 
specifically on tackling synthetic drugs (RCMP, 2009). For resources to be effectively 
allocated programs should be designed that reflect the reality of the synthetic drug market 
in the Quebec province, and to take into account variations in market characteristics 
according to region.  
Although the limitations of the available data does not allow for validation of the 
market structure, it does illustrate the distinct characteristics of this market and the value of 
applying innovative methodological frameworks. Innovative analyses have been 
encouraged when assessing illicit markets, which is noted by Caulkins and Reuters (2006):  
Although data presently available does not allow for model 
validation…nevertheless [it] illustrates the richness of possible behaviours of 
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markets for illicit drugs and the value of being open to models built up from the 
special properties of those markets, rather than merely importing standard analysis 
and conclusions (p. 2).  
In markets where research and data sources are scarce the value of approaching an 
illicit market from another method enriches our understanding and provides us with new 
models to validate findings, rather than repeatedly using  familiar methods that leave us 
with the same fragmented conclusions. Triangulating the findings of studies with other 
sources augment the reliability of our results and provides a comprehensive understanding 
of illicit markets. To enhance the reliability of the findings in the current study, more 
detailed information regarding seizures should be obtained, including the concentration of 
substances in tablets, which can be used to validate links between manufacturers at a more 
detailed level and provide greater understanding of this market traditionally hidden from 
the purview of researchers.  
Notes 
1
 We would like to thank Dr. Louis-Eric Trudeau, Professor in the Department of Pharmacology at 
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Within the limits of the available data, the results of this study infer that the 
synthetic drug market in the Quebec province may be composed of a high number of small 
structures with a high number of independent producers, indicating a competitive market. 
In addition, this study provides further insight into the inner dynamics of the drug market, 
including the potential influence of production costs and relational features on retail prices 
based on the economic analysis. However, these inferences are only as good as the data 
sources and statistical tests used to derive them. To provide accurate interpretations of the 
findings the below section will provide an in-depth exploration of the study’s shortcomings 
and the implications of the findings within these limitations.  
Shortcomings and Advantages of the Analyses 
While these results provide us with greater insight into the market, as with any 
criminological study it is important to take into account both the methodological and 
practical limitations when interpreting the results. To begin with, the drug composition data 
in this sample lacks detailed information about the concentration of the individual 
substances present in the synthetic drug tablets. Only having information about the contents 
of each tablet and not their respective concentration we risk inferring that all tablets that 
contain the same ingredients originated from the same production batch when in fact each 
tablet may have different quantities of the substances, thus potentially coming from 
different batches and indicating multiple manufacturers. Having information on the 
percentage of each substance in the tablets would allow for more accurate and reliable 
appraisals of the market’s structure. As this level of detail was unavailable for the current 
study, this limitation was minimized by taking into account both the physical and chemical 
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features of the tablet when making links between drugs to determine their origin. Thus, 
drugs that shared the highest number of characteristics were also determined to have the 
highest likelihood of originating from the same manufacturer. The data source used in this 
study is in contrast to research conducted by Esseiva et al (2003), Esseiva et al (2007), and 
Zingg (2005) who performed highly sophisticated extraction methods that recorded 
precisely the amount of each substance present in the seized drug, providing more accurate 
links between drugs with shared characteristics.  
Although there is concern that the chemical and physical profiles of synthetic drugs 
do not reflect the manufacturers that produced them, the tablet form that these drugs were 
pressed in helps alleviate this fear. Given that all the synthetic drugs in this sample were 
pressed into a tablet they have a distinct advantage over analyses conducted in other drug 
markets such as cocaine, as they are more likely to reflect the manufacturer that made them 
(Palbol, Boyer, Naulet & Chabrillat, 2002). In contrast to drugs in other markets the 
chemical and physical properties of synthetic drugs are more likely to remain static 
throughout the distribution chain (from manufacturer to consumer), as traffickers who 
distribute the drug post-production are unable to alter the composition of the drug by 
adding cutting agents (Zingg, 2005). Thus, a synthetic drug’s profile is more likely to be 
confined to the manufacturer, which increases the reliability of the inferences made about 
the structure of the synthetic drug market. 
However, a drug’s physical profile may not be reflective of the manufacturer who 
produced it. There are two separate steps involved in production of a synthetic drug tablet, 
the chemical synthesis of the drug and the compression of the tablet (Baer, 2007). 
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Consequently an individual other than the manufacturer may compress the tablet, forming 
its physical properties such as logo, shape, weight, and diameter. Thus, different 
manufacturers may produce tablets with identical physical profiles, should they all source 
out to the same individual who compresses the drug into tablet form (Baer, 2007). 
Problems with the using the colour and logo to make links between drugs has been 
expressed by other researchers (Milliet, Weyermann & Esseiva, 2009). Despite these issues 
associated with the physical characteristics of synthetic drugs, including their low 
reliability, it has been stated that they should still be used as another source of 
complementary information (Marquis et al, 2008). Although physical profiles should not be 
used on their own to identify a manufacturer, they can still be used in conjunction with 
chemical profiles as a supplementary source of data to confirm links between 
manufacturers.  
Additionally, further issues exist with using synthetic drug’s physical profiles, 
including its logo and colour, to identify the structure of the drug market. Manufacturers 
may duplicate logos due to their popularity or because the logo has become an indicator on 
the illegal market of a high quality tablet (Bell, Barrett, Burns, Dennis & Speers, 2003). 
This was demonstrated in a study by Bell et al (2003) who found that almost all of the 
MDMA tablets they seized had a “Mitsubishi” logo although it was not possible that all 
these tablets had originated from the same producer. Consequently, drug logos are 
unreliable physical indicators because many manufacturers use the same logo and therefore 
they do not necessarily reflect the drug’s composition or the manufacturer. 
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Furthermore, colour is also a poor indicator of a manufacturer because differences 
are frequently very minor between producers (Zingg, 2005). Different colours may indicate 
that it was made by a different manufacturer yet this distinguishing characteristic can only 
be perceived if tablets are directly compared beside one another, which is rarely possible, as 
even large drug seizures are not representative of all the drugs in the illegal market. In 
addition, large seizures often require that numerous analysts extract and categorize the 
physical properties of seized drugs. These analysts are unlikely to obtain consistent and 
reliable results due to the subjective nature of identifying a drug’s colour (Zingg, 2005). 
In addition to the aforementioned limitations, this study hinges on a few 
assumptions, the primary being the premise that manufacturers consistently use the same 
recipe and methods. Very little research has explored the synthetic drug market and it has 
not been established that manufacturers consistently produce the same tablets. Due to this 
we risk concluding that there are multiple producers operating in the synthetic drug market 
in cases where there are a large number of distinct profiles present, when in fact it may only 
be one producer altering his manufacturing process. However, based off current research 
about synthetic drug manufacturers, this risk may be lower for high quality tablets and 
higher for low quality tablets. Manufacturers who produce high quality tablets may be more 
likely to consistently use the same recipe and synthesis methods, as not only is it difficult to 
modify high quality recipes and still obtain proper results, but there is no rationale for a 
drug producer to change the manufacturing process (Baer, 2007). The risks of changing a 
drug recipe are high, as not only would it be more challenging and few incentives to sell an 
inferior quality product, but a minor change in the type, quantity of ingredients or 
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production methods may be dangerous, resulting in a chemical explosion. In contrast, 
manufacturers who produce low quality tablets may be more likely to modify their recipes. 
Drug producers with relatively little experience that primarily produce low quality drugs 
may modify their recipes in an aim to create a higher quality end product.   
Further limitations also exist with the economic analysis. To begin with, the data 
only allowed us to assess whether the clustering of marketing variables influenced prices. 
As outlined in the literature review, a multitude of factors influence prices and the current 
data was unable to conduct a comprehensive analysis of these determinants. Thus, the 
findings in the price determinant section may be attributed to confounding factors. A major 
limitation rested with not knowing the quantity of drugs that were purchased during each 
transaction.  Thus, a tablets price may be lower in a specific region not because of distinct 
traits of this market, but rather because market players purchased the drug in greater 
quantities. This study was unable to account for this possibility due to the limitations of the 
data.  
An additional shortcoming involves the drug’s purity, as we did not have 
information for the quantity of each substance present in the tablet.  Although this was 
discussed as a shortcoming in the data composition analysis it is equally applicable to the 
economic analysis. In illicit markets prices may remain stable while the drug’s purity 
fluctuates in response to market changes (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998). Purity varies widely 
within illicit drug markets (Caulkins & Reuter, 1998)  with large fluctuations observed in 
methamphetamine in the U.S. over the past 15 years (Caulkins et al, 2004). Changes to the 
drug’s purity may be done due to chemical shortages, such as precursor regulation 
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(Cunningham and Liu, 2003) with producers diluting the drug to increase the drug’s 
volume and stabilize profits. The current study was unable to account for this due to the 
available data. 
A final limitation of the seized drugs in this sample is that it cannot be determined 
whether they are reflective of the total illegal drug market. Law enforcement officials are 
estimated to seize only ten percent of all drugs that are circulating in the illegal market 
(Zingg, 2005). In addition, the tablets in this sample are only a subset of all samples, 
selected by law enforcement officials to be examined by Health Canada. To reduce this risk 
and to increase the representativity of results, seizures should be collected from different 
geographic regions in order to paint a better picture of all drug activity in an area (Zingg, 
2005). Both the fact that the drugs have been seized from various regions in Quebec and 
that our results were supplemented with other data sources, including its price help, at least 
in part, to overcome this.  
Given the shortcomings, this study advances an exploration into the potential causes 
of these factors, advancing the necessity of more detailed information and research into this 
hidden market. This study would benefit from a qualitative analysis that assessed 
production methods and synthetic drug producers’ behaviours and practices to provide 
more reliable interpretations. Due to the limitations, this paper does not advance that this 
method should be applied in strict criminal identification of manufacturers, but rather as a 
supplemental source of information to provide a better grasp into the dynamics of an 
otherwise hidden market. This thesis contributes to the study of the synthetic drug market 
by providing valuable information about how drug properties can be used to examine the 
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synthetic drug market, informing us about the possible structure of this market, and raising 
awareness of the value of recording detailed information about drug seizures to monitor and 
learn about the market. 
Allocation of Resources and Policy Implications 
What can be cautiously inferred from the data in this study, in regard to a 
competitive market structure and unique characteristics according to production costs and 
distributor-consumer relations, can assist authorities in creating more intelligence led and 
proactive programs to effectively target drug manufacturers. The detection and arrest of 
members of drug trafficking groups face many challenges, and it has been recognized that 
in order to effectively accomplish this goal requires that law enforcement officials 
participate in an information exchange with numerous players, including forensic drug 
analysts (Esseiva et al, 2007). This is particularly relevant given the lack of research, to 
date, on the synthetic drug market and the priority that the Canadian government has 
accorded to combat the synthetic drug industry. Recently, in 2009, the RCMP Synthetic 
Drug Initiative launched the first ever Canadian drug strategy to focus specifically on 
tackling synthetic drugs (RCMP, 2009). In addition, only days after the most recent 
publication of the UNODC’s World Drug Report (2012), that highlighted Canada’s 
purportedly growing role in the global synthetic drug market, it was announced that Canada 
donated over $800,000 to their Global Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting and 
Trends Programme (SMART), totalling Canada’s donation to more than U.S. $1.3 million 
dollars over the past two years (UNODC, 2012). For resources to be effectively allocated, 
programs should be designed that reflect the reality of the synthetic drug market in the 
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Quebec province and take into account variations in market characteristics according to 
region, rather than attempting to tackle a highly structured organization, which is 
inconsistent with research.  
Additionally, synthetic drug profiles can increase the number of successful criminal 
prosecutions, as they can be used to provide reliable evidence in the courtroom. To begin 
with, synthetic drug profiles are considered objective tools to generate information, as 
different analysts can repeatedly test them and they will consistently obtain the same results 
(Zingg, 2005). This is in contrast to the testimony of a police officer or witness, which is 
considered subjective, as it may be influenced by the individual’s perspective or situation 
and cannot always be verified by different sources. Secondly, the chemical and physical 
properties of synthetic drug profiles generally remain stable and do not alter or significantly 
undergo degradation over time (Zingg, 2005). Thus, a seized drug profile can be re-
examined at different points in times and will continue to reflect the manufacturer who 
produced them. In addition, synthetic drug profiles may have the ability to demonstrate the 
extent of a drug trafficker’s activity in an organized crime group (Dujourdy et al, 2003). 
For example if it can be determined that the accused, a drug manufacturer, constantly uses 
the same recipe and therefore has manufactured tablets that carry the same drug profile it 
can be demonstrated, at minimum how many tablets he produced, by examining drug 
seizures. This may influence the severity of a criminal sentence, as it allows us to separate 
large, wholesale manufacturers from small, one-time producers. Individuals who were 
heavily involved in the synthetic drug market may receive more punitive sentences, in 
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contrast to small producers who only participated in the production of drugs a few times 
over short careers. 
The benefits of this highly valued intelligence gathering tool suggest that forensic 
drug composition analysis should be implemented into law enforcement techniques. As 
mentioned, the results obtained from analysts of synthetic drug profiles can provide 
valuable information to law enforcement agencies on the inner workings and overall 
versatility of these drug trafficking groups to better guide investigation techniques that aim 
to decrease drug production over the long term. Lastly, if seized synthetic drug profiles are 
analyzed over long periods it will generate extensive databases that will permit researchers 
to analyze how the structure of the synthetic drug market changes over time and enable 
them to observe how or if it transforms in response to police enforcement intervention 
efforts. Consequently, it provides police with a feedback system to observe whether the 
programs they have implemented are having an effect on drug trafficking. 
Directions for Future Research 
This study aimed at bridging a knowledge gap about the structural features of the 
synthetic drug market and factors that influence synthetic drugs prices. The results of the 
analysis, albeit with limitations, provide support for a competitive perspective of the drug 
market. These findings closely follows that of earlier research that claims illegal markets 
are characterized by competitive structures with many small groups operating in the same 
market, contrary to the claims made at the beginning of this paper in regard to large groups 
dominating Canada’s drug market. Providing additional information about the distinct 
features of the synthetic drug market, this study also demonstrated that both the drug’s 
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quality and marketing factors play a marginal role in influencing the drug’s final price, 
depending on the region. In sum, this study suggests that regional differences are a result of 
different production costs and relations between trafficker and supplier, which may be 
influenced by the ratio between demand and supply and hence traffickers reliance on the 
user for repeat business. While inferences can be made about the drug market based on 
these findings, more extensive research needs to be conducted to further enhance the 
reliability of the results. The wide ranging benefits of using synthetic drug profiles, 
including more effective police techniques and an enhanced understanding of market 
features, make this a method that should be diligently pursued by researchers and 
enforcement organizations to effectively target and learn more about the intricate processes 
that underlie the illegal synthetic drug world. 
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